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This thesis assesses the prospects for building a constitutional structure for 
the European Union (EU) that will secure popular support and protect national 
sovereignty, in the light of four theories of political integration: functionalism, 
neofunctionalism, federalism, and concurrent majority. The thesis assumes that 
the people in the nation-states comprising the EU wish, for the most part, to 
retain a significant measure of sovereignty as part of their national identity. The 
thesis concludes that functionalism and neofunctionalism rely too much on the 
elite decision-making process to preserve popular sovereignty and that they 
would, in the long term, strip the EU member states of their sovereignty. 
Federalism is also likely to be repellent to many in the EU countries because it 
tends to transfer the sovereignty of the states to the central government, and the 
process of judicial review may leave the member states with no protection from 
encroachment by the central government. The theory of concurrent majority, the 
thesis determines, holds the greatest promise for maintaining and deepening the 
cohesiveness of the EU. A concurrent majority system would allow the member 
states to retain their sovereignty, and the ultimate interpretation of the EU 
"constitution" would rest with the states collectively. The thesis recommends 
that a clearly written constitution be drawn up at the 1996 EU Intergovernmental 
Conference to be ratified by the citizens of the member states, if they wish to 
ensure protection for national rights and sovereignty. 
-VI- 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
I. INTRODUCTION 1 
A. HYPOTHESES 6 
1. Functionalism and Neo-Functionalism 6 
2. Federalism 7 
3. Concurrent Majority 7 
B. METHODOLOGY 7 
II. FUNCTIONALISM AND NEOFUNCTIONALISM 11 
A. FUNCTIONALISM 11 
B. NEOFUNCTIONALISM 18 
III. FEDERALISM 29 
A. JAMES MADISON AND FEDERALISM 30 
1. Analysis of Madison's Theory of Federalism 35 
2. Contemporary Federalism as Compared with the 
Madisonian Model 37 
B. CARL FRIEDRICH AND FEDERALISM 43 
1. "United Europe - An Emergent Federal Order?" 47 
2. Analysis of Friedrich's Theory of Federalism 48 
C. CONCLUSION 50 
IV. THE THEORY OF CONCURRENT MAJORITY 53 
A. THE PATRICK HENRY/ONSLOW LETTER CONTROVERSY 55 
B. THE NULLIFICATION CRISIS 59 
C. DISQUISITION ON GOVERNMENT AND THE THEORY OF 
CONCURRENT MAJORITY 70 
1. Analysis of Calhoun's Examples 75 
a. The First Polish Republic 75 
b. The Confederacy of Six Nations 77 
c. The Roman Republic 78 
d. The English Constitution in the Classical Age 79 
D. CALHOUN'S ANALYSIS OF THE JUDICIARY 81 
E. CONCLUSION 84 
V. CONCLUSION 89 
A. KEY FINDINGS 89 
1. Functionalism and Neofunctionalism 90 
a. Inaccuracy of the Model 90 
b. Logical Consequences of Functionalism and 
Neofunctionalism 90 
2. Federalism 90 
a. Sovereignty 91 
b. Judicial Review 91 
3. Theory of Concurrent Majority 92 
-Vll- 
B. A EUROPEAN CONSTITUTION BASED ON THE THEORY OF 
CONCURRENT MAJORITY 92 
1. The European Parliament, the Council of Ministers and 
the Commission 93 
2. The European Court of Justice 97 
3. The Member States 104 
C CONCLUDING REMARKS 107 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 109 
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST • 117 
-V1U- 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
The author wishes to express his sincere thanks to Professor David Yost 
for his invaluable guidance and comments during the course of writing this 
thesis. Without Professor Yost's advice and encouragement, this thesis would 
not have been possible. The author also wishes to express his gratitude to 
Professor Frank Teti for challenging students to think beyond what they are used 
to, and in the process, to expand their horizons. Thanks are also owed to the 
author's parents, whose encouragement and guidance led to this thesis. And 
lastly, the author expresses heartfelt thanks to his wife, whose encouragement 
makes everything possible. If there are any mistakes or errors, they are the fault 
of the author alone. 
-IX- 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Whatever political tendencies or currents we choose as examples, it will be found that they always sow the 
seed of their own destruction when they lose their sense of proportion and overstep their limits J 
(Wilhelm Röpke) 
I he aim of this thesis is to assess the European Union's prospects for cohesion. 
It is important for United States' national security interests to reach reliable 
judgments about the EU's prospects for cohesion because of the EU's intrinsic 
economic, political and strategic importance. 
In the economic sphere, which will not be discussed in great detail in this 
thesis, the EU boasts a combined market that buys twenty-four percent of U.S. 
exports, and furnishes eighteen percent of U.S. imports.2 In 1993, the United 
States had over $200 billion worth of trade with the European Union, as much as 
with Japan and China combined.3 The EU's combined gross domestic product 
(GDP) was recently calculated at $6.9 trillion4, its total exports are over twice 
those of the United States, and its population exceeds that of the U.S. by at least 
70 million.5 The European Union is an entity, economically, that the U.S. cannot 
afford to ignore. 
The EU has, potentially, much to offer in the sphere of Eurasian security. 
With total armed forces of over two million6, an excellent defense industry 
infrastructure, and claiming two of the world's five recognized nuclear powers, 
1
 Wilhelm Röpke, A Humane Economy: The Social Framework of the Free Market (New York: 
University Press of America, 1986 [I960]): 90. 
2Mary H. Cooper, "Europe 1992: The Issues" CO Researcher (28 June 1991):   The figure was 
calculated for the twelve members which comprised the EU at that time. 
3
 "America and Europe," The Economist (19 February 1994): 24. 
4
"Main Economic Indicators/' OECD (January 1995). The figures are calculated for the current 15 
member-nations of the EU; the data given in the OECD report is for the year 1993-calculated in 
1993 dollars-except for Belgium, Greece, Ireland and Luxembourg, whose figures are for 1991. 
5
 "Back to the Drawing Board," The Economist (10 September 1994): 22. 
6Ibid. 
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the EU has the technological capability and resources to become a military power 
on par with the United States. A cohesive EU defense force could have a major 
impact on the continent, especially in countering the aggrandizing tendencies of 
Russia in its "near abroad." Several of the member nations wield substantial 
influence in Africa and the Middle East regions as well. Such capabilities could 
allow the United States to diminish its defense burdens. 
The relative degree of cohesion achieved by the EU will be an extremely 
important factor in determining whether the United States will face a single 
political-military entity across the North Atlantic, or a potentially fractured set of 
antagonistic nation-states. The EU's cohesion has significant implications for the 
future of NATO and other trans-Atlantic institutions (e.g., Partnership For Peace, 
and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe); and for 
international security management efforts regarding nuclear proliferation and 
ethnic and environmental conflict. The EU's cohesion, decision-making 
processes, and probable future course therefore constitute an important issue for 
U.S. strategic planners and policy-makers. 
But, before the EU can build its political cohesion and obtain such military 
capabilities, several important obstacles must be surmounted. Politically, the 
debate about "an ever closer union" is in some ways more spirited now than ever 
before. With the advent of the Maastricht Treaty (the Treaty on European Union) 
and the official recognition of a European Union, some nations within the EU are 
very hesitant about losing their sovereignty. It is difficult to convince a nation to 
subordinate itself to a higher political authority on the issues that matter the 
most: economics, security, and the social well-being of its citizens. 
The current debate about an "ä la carte" EU versus an EU of concentric 
circles presents the people of Europe with a choice that has important 
-2- 
consequences. Several of the national leaders, in particular John Major of 
Britain/ are partial to the idea of an "ä la carte" Europe where a nation has the 
option to pick and choose which of the EU arrangements it prefers to participate 
in and which it prefers to abstain from. For instance, Britain could participate in 
the EU's foreign and trade policies while abstaining from the social and labor 
policies. A shortcoming to this approach is that nations that choose to partake in 
a majority of the options may view nations that choose only a few options as free 
riders. 
A Union of concentric circles has been suggested by some politicians in 
France and Germany.8 In this conception, the EU would be centered on a core of 
nations, most likely the Benelux nations, Italy, France and Germany; and France 
and Germany would comprise the "core of the hard cores."9 Opponents of this 
integrative method argue that it would force the EU into a two-speed system. 
Also, the critics opine, in order for the outside nations to join the "inner core," 
they would have to give up more than the "inner core" nations initially 
relinquished. Moreover, as the EU grew in size, the "inner core" nations might 
attempt to retain the same amount of relative influence within the EU at the 
expense of the entering nations, making, in effect, second class citizens of the 
new EU members. 
Nations in both categories have another serious question: how much 
sovereignty and decision-making authority should be relinquished to the 
European Commission in Brussels? For once sovereignty and decision-making 
7
"European Union," The Economist (10 September 1994): 21-23. The reference was in regards to a 
speech by Prime Minister Major at the Hague on 7 September, 1994. See also "The Memorandum 
on The United Kingdom Government's Approach To The Treatment Of European Defence Issues 
At The 1996 Inter-Governmental Conference." 
8
"Europe ä la carte," The Economist (10 September 1994): 14-15. 
9
 "European Union," The Economist (10 September 1994): 21-23. 
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authority are relinquished, it is difficult to retrieve them without a political 
struggle. Indeed, history has demonstrated that political struggles over 
sovereignty and decision-making authority can easily degenerate into a conflict 
of arms. 
Along with the political aspects of the European Union come the economic 
and security issues that the EU is currently contending with. The common 
agricultural policy (CAP) currently takes over fifty percent of the total EU 
budget.10 With the completion of the Uruguay round of the General Agreement 
on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), the EU is committed (on paper) to lower the tariffs 
that protect the EU farmers. This fact, and the Eastern Europeans' pressures to 
export goods, are rapidly creating a competitive international market. This poses 
a threat to EU farmers. Moreover, some nations' economic interests are not 
coincidental with the rest of the EU; the question then becomes, which policy has 
priority, the national or the European?11 
Security planning is complicated by the fact that many in the United States 
favor arrangements to encourage the NATO Europeans to pay a larger share of 
the defense costs for American troops on European soil. The Central and East 
Europeans are trying to get under the collective defense umbrella of NATO, 
while the Russians are trying to turn NATO into a collective security 
organization, thus destroying NATO as a collective defense pact. In this context, 
European security trends could end in a situation unfavorable to the EU.12 
10
"Tilling the soil in a wider Europe," The Economist (20 August 1994): 15-16. The figure is for 
the 1993 EU budget. 
nFor example, Spain's interests on fishing rights are in contradistinction with the agreement the 
EU made with Canada; see "Bigger fishers, small nets, smaller stocks," The Economist (8 April 
1995): 48. 
12
"Partners for what?" The Economist (24 September 1994): 40-50.  See also Gordon Smith, 
"Managing EU-NATO Relations," International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS 36& Annual 
It is in the interest of the United States to promote the development of an 
EU that is more effective as a political and economic entity. Economically, it is 
much easier to conduct trade negotiations with one trade representative than 
with fifteen separate representatives with their own agendas; the same reasoning 
applies in the political and security realms as well.13 Yet the two paths to 
integration mentioned above do not promise to create an effective EU. The "ä la 
carte" method would allow the members to become too fractured, and would not 
promote effective decision-making at the Union-level. The union of concentric 
circles might, under some circumstances, lead to an abuse of power by the inner 
circle members over the outer circle members. 
In order for the European Union to overcome its present difficulties, and 
be prepared to surmount future difficulties as well, it needs to operate as an 
effective entity. In order to be effective, the EU needs to have unity, to be able to 
make coherent decisions in a reasonable amount of time. But how, one may ask, 
is the European Union to reach a level of unity to enable it to operate effectively, 
yet at the same time ensure the liberty and sovereignty of the member-states? 
This is the conundrum that the member states of the European Union are facing 
as they are approaching the 1996 Intergovernmental Conferences. 
The EU institutions seem to be inadequate for the current number of 
member states, and are seen by many to be wholly inadequate for an increase in 
size due to future members.14 The efficiency of the European Commission is 
predicted by some to decrease as the number of Commissioners increase. And 
Conference, Vancouver, 8-11 September 1994), and Douglas Hurd "Developing the Common 
Foreign and Security Policy," International Affairs 70, no. 3 (1994): 421-428. 
13Although some may argue that it is in the best interest of the United States to see the EU as a 
splintered and ineffective organization in order for the United States to retain as much influence 
in Europe as possible. 
14
"Talks about Talks," The Economist (13 May 1995): 52-53. 
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the Council of Ministers is seen by some as the tyranny of the minority in that 
"small countries with just 12% of the Union's population would be able to stymie 
the wishes of the remaining 88%."15 As the progress for "an ever closer union" 
continues, these constitutional questions will remain in the forefront of debate 
among the member states. 
This thesis uses four different theories of political integration to assess the 
prospects for the EU becoming a cohesive political structure. The theories will 
also assess the prospects for building a constitutional structure as it relates to 
protecting national sovereignty and securing the popular support required to 
give the EU its legitimacy. These theories are functionalism (and its close 
relative, neofunctionalism), federalism in its various facets, and John C. 
Calhoun's theory of concurrent majority. The hypotheses of the different 
theories to be tested may be summarized as follows. 
A. HYPOTHESES 
1. Functionalism and Neo-Functionalism 
a. The functional tasks of economic and welfare cooperation, 
outside the area of political conflict, will create a community of interest and 
feeling which will ultimately make national frontiers meaningless. 
b. The organization and scope of this activity can be functionally 
determined, varying according to the task, without the deliberate elaboration of a 
constitutional framework.16 
15
 Ibid.: 52. The article contends that the disproportionate representation is a point of contention 
for the large EU members. 
16R.J. Harrison, 'Testing Functionalism," in Functionalism: Theory and Practice in International 
Relations: 115. The two strategies are derived from David Mitrany's A Working Peace System: 




a. When states come into a compact with one another, the 
sovereignty that resided in the states is transferred to the central authority. 
b. The central government has the proper authority and ultimate 
jurisdiction within the federal system.17 
3. Concurrent Majority 
a. When states come together in a compact, the sovereignty is 
retained in the states. 
b. To ensure the sovereignty of the states in the compact, the 
constitution will be written to delegate certain enumerated powers to the central 
government, powers only necessary for the well being of the union. The 
constitution will be strictly adhered to with the appropriate amending criteria set 
forth to allow the constitution to properly adjust in concert with an ever- 
changing union. 
c. The right of judgment will ultimately reside in the states in order 
to prevent encroachment by the central government; with proper safeguards set 
forth to prevent the domination of the union by one or a few states.18 
B. METHODOLOGY 
I   his thesis analyzes the examples contained in the expositions advanced by 
the most prominent exponents of each particular theory of integration in 
order to assess their validity.   The second chapter examines the theories of 
functionalism and neofunctionalism. The examples analyzed are those used by 
17James Madison, Alexander Hamilton and John Jay The Federalist Papers ed. by Isaac Kramnick 
(New York: Penguin Books, 1987): 254-259, Federalist Number Thirty-Nine, and Carl J. Friedrich 
Trends of Federalism in Theory and Practice (New York: Frederick A Praeger, 1968). 
18The Papers of Tohn C. Calhoun Volumes X, XI and XII, Robert O. Meriwether, Edwin W. 
Hemphill, and Clyde N. Wilson et al., eds. (Columbia S.C.: University of South Carolina Press, 
1978) and John C. Calhoun, Union and Liberty Ross Lence, ed., (Indianapolis, IN: Liberty Fund, 
1992). 
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the main theorists. Functionalism's main proponent, David Mitrany, uses the 
European Goal and Steel Community (ECSC), and the subsequent European 
Economic Community (EEC). Neofunctionalism's creator, Ernst Haas, uses the 
example of the International Labor Organization (ILO). The thesis then examines 
the United Nations (UN)--as an organization held by the functionalists and 
neofunctionalists to be an example of their respective theories~and then 
considers whether the UN is an adequate model for the EU to emulate. 
Chapter III discusses the theory of federalism within the framework of 
James Madison's contribution to the Federalist Papers (in particular, Federalist No.'s 
Ten, Thirty-Nine and Fifty-One), as well as Carl Friedrich's Trends of Federalism in 
Theory and Practice.19 The analysis of Madison is directed at his particular 
theories of federalism in the United States of America. The thesis then examines 
the subsequent path that American federalism has taken. Friedrich discusses 
federalism as a process of integration in the European Union since its inception 
in 1950.20 
John C. Calhoun's theory of concurrent majority in the fourth chapter 
offers the examples of the governments of the Republic of Poland-Lithuania, the 
Iroquois Confederacy of Six Nations, the United Kingdom (circa 1688) and the 
Roman Republic. The thesis uses outside sources regarding each of the examples 
to determine whether these theories of integration are, in fact, supported by these 
examples. Next, the thesis evaluates each of the four theories as a framework for 
understanding the European Union, as it exists now and under the articles of the 
Maastricht Treaty. 
19Carl Friedrich, Trends of Federalism in Theory and Practice (New York: Frederick Praeger and 
Co., 1968). 
20Although Friedrich's book analyzes other cases, this thesis considers only the United States and 
the European Union. 
Finally, the fifth chapter attempts to determine which of the four theories 
(and their respective hypotheses)--functionalism (and neofunctionalism), 
federalism, and the theory of concurrent majority-would be the most effective 
for determining the probable future cohesiveness of the European Union. A 
hypothetical European constitution is then constructed, using the available 
political instruments in the EU, to reflect the most useful model. 
-9- 
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II. FUNCTIONALISM AND NEOFUNCTIONALISM 
I cannot accept your canon that we are to judge Pope and King unlike other men, with a favourable 
presumption that they did no wrong. If there is any presumption it is the other way against office holders 
of power, increasing as the power increases...Power tends to corrupt and absolute power corrupts 
absolutely. 21 (Lord Acton) 
A. FUNCTIONALISM 
L| unctionalism, in essence, derives from the premise that "form follows 
function." The main tenet of functionalism resides in the premise that all 
governments have adopted institutions that promote the welfare of the public.22 
The functional theory holds that as international community-level institutions 
increasingly tend to take care of these social needs, the citizens' loyalty will be 
transferred from the state to the community-level organization that is fulfilling 
their needs.23 Then, in conjunction with the creation of this new organization, or, 
with changes in science or technology that affect the society, there will be new 
problems that give rise to another need for more community-level control of the 
problem. Mitrany calls this process "ramification."24 Instead of the state serving 
in its traditional role as the protector of life, liberty and property, the new 
community-level international organization provides social security and welfare 
to citizens of all the member nations, thus cutting across the bounds of territorial 
disputes and violence. 
21John E. E. D. Acton, "Letter to Mr. Creighton, 5 April 1887," Essays in the Study and Writing of 
History Volume II, J. Rufus Fears, ed., (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 1986): 383. 
22David Mitrany, "The Prospect of Integration: Federal or Functional?" in A. J. R. Groom and 
Paul Taylor, eds., Functionalism:  Theory and Practice in International Relations (New York: 
Crane, Russak and Company, Inc., 1975): 53-78. 
23Paul Taylor and AJ Groom, 'Introduction:   Functionalism and International Relations," 
Functionalism: Theory and Practice in International Relations: 4. 
24James E. Dougherty, and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr., Contending Theories of International 
Relations (New York: Harper Collins Publishers, 1990): 433. 
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Functionalism tends to disdain the idea of supra-national or 
intergovernmental organizations, instead preferring the idea of a community of 
organizations which have political control of the economic and welfare planning 
process. The functionalist tends also to prefer the scientific, or positivistic, 
problem-solving methodology. Objectivity and utilitarian viewpoints are 
believed to circumvent the antagonistic aspects of societal interaction, thus 
preventing conflict between peoples or governments.25 
The functionalists believe that the promotion of an international welfare 
system will "undermine loyalties to the state and build an international socio- 
psychological community which transcends the frontiers of the state."26 
According to A.J.R. Groom, the goal is to create, in essence, a "Fabian" society.27 
This process of allegiance-shifting, according to the functionalists, occurs almost 
instinctively, without any conscious thought. According to Mitrany, 
functionalism is based upon five different propositions about society and two 
strategies that flow from them: 
1. Economic and welfare interests provide a basis for community. 
2. The nation-state is without any permanent basis. It is divisive, violent and 
blinds men to their real needs and interests. 
3. The satisfaction of economic and welfare needs creates common interests 
though specific interests may differ in kind and degree. 
4. The elements of world community are already in place...(e.g., the United 
Nations). 
5. Political discussion, particularly constitution building,...\s divisive and prejudicial 
to community building (emphasis added). 
These five propositions lead to the following strategies. 
1. Specific functional tasks of economic and welfare cooperation, outside the area 
of political conflict, will create a community of interest and feeling which will 
ultimately make national frontiers meaningless. 
25A.J.R. Groom, "Introduction," in Functionalism: Theory and Practice in International Relations 
(New York: Crane, Russak and Company, Inc., 1975): 15. 
26Ibid.:4. 
27Ibid. The Fabian Society came into existence in the late nineteenth century with the goal of "the 
extinction of private property in land, and appropriation of all industrial capital by the 
community..." according to W.E.H. Leckes Democracy and Liberty, Volume II (Indianapolis, IN: 
Liberty Fund, 1981): 316; 
-12- 
2. The organization and scope of this activity can be functionally determined 
varying according to the task...without the deliberate elaboration of a 
constitutional framework.2" 
Although Mitrany discussed functionalism within national societies (such as the 
New Deal within the United States), this thesis will focus on his examples of 
functionalism involving several countries as more germane to assessing the 
future of the EU. 
In fact, one example of functionalism cited by Mitrany is the formation of 
the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC). France and Germany put 
control of their coal and steel industries into a community-level organization 
with a clearly defined set of parameters within which to operate.29 Then, the 
need for other community-level organizations became evident to alleviate the 
problems that arose from the birth of the ECSC. For example, the European 
Court of Justice was given more authority in order to properly settle any disputes 
between the member nations. The European Atomic Energy Community 
(Euratom) is yet another example for the functionalists of the creation of a 
community-level organization with a specialized need requiring technocrats 
instead of politicians.30 
Independent analyses of the ECSC state that the organization was formed 
not because of a commonly felt need to place control in a community-level 
institution, but rather due to the actions of governmental elites who had their 
own interests in mind.31   The French wanted the ECSC to keep German 
28R.J. Harrison, 'Testing Functionalism," in Functionalism: Theory and Practice in International 
Relations: 115. The five propositions and two strategies are derived from David Mitrany's A 
Working Peace System:   An Argument for the Functional Development of International 
Organization (London: RHA, 1943). 
29David Mitrany, "The Prospect of Integration: Federal or Functional?": 69. 
30Charles Pentland, International Theory and European Integration (New York: The Free Press, 
1973): 93. 
31
 Ibid.: 98. 
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industrial potential in close check. The Germans wanted the ECSC so that they 
could be recognized as an equal once again, and to prevent arousing suspicion 
about a German industrial build-up.32 The founder of the ECSC, Jean Monnet, 
envisaged the ECSC as "the first concrete foundation of a European federation."33 
As to Euratom, Charles Pentland states that the organization-instead of acting as 
a supranational economic coordinator of resources acting independently of the 
nation-state--has assumed the status of an organization devoted to "pure 
research" and acts as a "adjunct or complement to separate national nuclear 
programs."3* 
Mitrany, in his defense of functionalism, states that the need for nation- 
states to abandon their sovereignty stems from the "massive and rusty gates" of 
constitutionalism. In his view, constitutions hamper nations in reforming and 
adapting to the ever-changing, increasingly technological, international system.35 
The new challenges, according to Mitrany, can most effectively be handled by a 
centralized multi-national authority; but a nation with a constitution will resist 
every measure to put increasing control into a central multi-state authority, let 
alone a supranational authority.36 To Mitrany, the constitution is anathema to 
the process of functionalization. The right of suffrage of the citizen is also seen as 
a hindrance to the process of functionalization. Democracy is seen by Mitrany as 
32James B. Steinberg, "An Ever Closer Union:" European integration and its Implications for the 
Future of U.S. - European Relations (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1993): 4. See also footnote 7 on 
same page. 
33John Pinder, European Community: The Building of a Union (Oxford, UK: Oxford University 
Press, 1991): 4. Emphasis added. 
34Charles Pentland. International Theory and European Integration: 96. 
35David Mitrany, "The Functional Approach to World Organization," International Affairs 24, 
no. 3 (1948): 352. 
36Ibid.: 352-353. 
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a "snare and a delusion" which prevents the technical experts from being in 
positions of responsibility in order to solve the problems of society.37 
Functionalism appears useless for assessing the future cohesiveness of the 
European Union. Contrary to the ideas of Mitrany, the concept of the nation- 
state is still a viable principle. If the fifteen nations within the European Union 
were asked to relinquish their sovereignty, their answer would most likely be a 
unanimous no. Several of the nations with long histories of autonomy would be 
particularly loath to give control of their economic and political capital to an 
independent supranational organization that is only answerable to a "functional 
parliament" consisting of self-selected technocrats. Even if the functional process 
of unconscious integration or allegiance-shifting to an entity outside the national 
government was in process, the nation would almost certainly notice and 
attempt to arrest the process. 
For example, France noticed the attempt to have the European Parliament 
(EP) assume control of EEC expenditures and came forth with the "Luxembourg 
Compromise" in order to thwart qualified majority rule in the Council of 
Ministers.38 De Gaulle realized that if the EP gained any portion of control, the 
tendency to want to gain more control would always be prevalent. Therefore, in 
order to prevent the Council of Ministers from outvoting France, de Gaulle left 
the French chair on the Council vacant, thus preventing any decision-making.39 
The "Luxembourg Compromise" states that unanimity of the member nations 
37David Mitrany, "The Functional Approach in Historical Perspective," International Affairs 47, 
no. 3, (1971): 540.  Mitrany gives an example of an effective functional system in the United 
Nations with the specialized agencies and their "functional parliaments," which offer "functional 
representation." 
38
 John Pinder, European Community: 12-13. 
39Dick Leonard, Pocket Guide to the European Community (London: Basil Blackwell and The 
Economist Publications, 1989): 11. 
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shall be required when, in the opinion of one member, the matter at stake bears 
vital importance to the member.40 
Another problem with the functionalist model is the tendency for an ever- 
increasing amount of centralization to occur. Mitrany's assertion that the 
specialized areas of functionality would stay in their respective spheres runs 
counter to human nature and history. If there is not in place some sort of check 
or barrier against an organization, it will always try to gain more influence or 
power. For example, for every rise in a new functional organization there should 
be coordination with the other functional organizations to prevent redundancy 
and wastage of resources. But the more coordination that is required, the more 
centralized planning will have to take place, until the entire society comes under 
the jurisdiction of the centralized planning organization. The concept of 
centralized economic planning then comes into being with all of its concomitant 
problems. 
There are two major problems of the centralized planning concept. The 
first problem is the inefficiency of the allocation of resources. The second 
problem, and the most important to the member states, is the absolute 
surrendering of their sovereignty, politically and economically. The 
functionalists believe that the experts, engineers and technocrats that head the 
functional organization are the best qualified to determine the allocation of 
resources that come under the jurisdiction of that particular organization. Yet, as 
the former Soviet Union illustrated, and prominent economists have stated, the 
best allocation can never be determined by any centralized bureau.41 
^bid.: 35-36. 
41
 For an excellent account of the planning process of the former Soviet Union, see Mikhail Heller 
and Aleksandr Nekrich, Utopia in Power The History of the Soviet Union From 1917 to the 
Present (New York Simon & Schuster, 1986). See especially pages 632-633 for a comparison 
between the Soviet centralized agriculture system and the agriculture output of the United States. 
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The second problem would end up reducing the member states to 
administrative units used in the centralized planning process.   The reason 
national sovereignty would end up in the "dustbin of history" is succinctly stated 
by economist Wilhelm Röpke: 
In the case of real integration of national economies which, being socialist, 
depend entirely on a sovereign political direction, the countries concerned would 
have to be so thoroughly united politically that the union would be tantamount 
to annexation by the leading power...Consequently, such integration has only 
been successful when,...national sovereignty has been literally annihilated by 
force, i.e. by the act of annexation.4^ 
In the case of the EU, of course, the socialism identified by Röpke is not a 
predominant factor in the governments of the major countries, including 
Germany, the leading economic power of the EU. 
The functionalists would also be hesitant to consider any formal treaty (or 
constitution) in the forming of a closer union. The reason for the functionalists' 
distaste for written constitutions in a supra- or international compact is that the 
constitution is seen as a hindrance to the centralization process of further 
integration. The constitution would act as a warning device anytime the act of 
"ramification" was occurring, thus halting the functionalization process. Lastly, 
the ideal of a socialistic welfare state has undergone tremendous critical scrutiny 
in the past several years. With the disintegration of the "workers' paradise" of 
For an economists' viewpoint on centralized planning under the functionalist skein, see F.A. 
Hayek The Counter-Revolution of Science: Studies on the Abuse of Reason (Indianapolis: 
Liberty Fund, 1979 [1952]). Hayek states that the affinity towards planners and engineers is 
directly attributable to Henri de Saint-Simon, the French philosopher who held that science and 
scientific planning could effectively run government without the help of politicians. See also 
Ludwig von Mises Socialism: An Economic and Sociological Analysis (Indianapolis IN: Liberty 
Fund, 1981). For a philosophical inquiry into to the inherent problems of central planning and 
the functionalist approach in general, see Michael Oakeshott, Rationalism in Politics and Other 
Essays (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 1991 [1962]), especially 6-42. Oakeshotf s thesis is that the 
Rationalists' belief in pure human reason to guide and solve all of life's problems in the political 
sphere is not only fallacious but dangerous. 
^Wilhelm Röpke, "The Place of the Nation," Modern Age (Spring 1966): 127. 
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the USSR, and the fact that the most socialized nations within the EU at present 
are facing growing difficulties in financing their welfare expenditures, the 
functionalist ideal of a welfare state is in jeopardy. 
B. NEOFUNCTIONALISM 
"^Teofunctionalism, while similar to functionalism in its assumptions about 
social advancement, holds that the process of integration requires an act of 
deliberate choice to come into existence. The neofunctionalists contend that 
people, or more specifically, the elites, make a conscious decision to put the 
authority for specific activities into a supranational organization in order to 
maximize their gains.43 Performing these activities would generate "new 
problems which, if the new demands and expectations of the organization were 
to be met, could only be resolved by more integration and by granting more 
powers to the central authorities."44 This process is known as the "spill-over" 
effect.45 
The neofunctionalists, starting with Ernst Haas, use the ECSC as the 
standard-bearer example. The ECSC, according to the neofunctionalists, was 
initially not supported by many of the elites in Europe. But, as the success of the 
ECSC became clearer, the elites "placed themselves in the vanguard of other 
efforts for European integration, including the Common Market."46 The 
neofunctionalists tend to favor the technocratic method of political leadership, 
although they do concede that the political relationships involving the traditional 
nation-states are a critical factor in the process of integration. 
43James E. Dougherty and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr. Contending Theories of International 
Relations: A Comprehensive Survey Third Edition, (New York: Harper Collins Publishers, 1990): 
438. 
^Nina Heathcote, "Neofunctional Theories of Regional Integration," Functionalism: Theory and 
Practice in International Relations: 40. 
45Ibid. 
^Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff, Contending Theories of International Relations: 439. 
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Haas also uses the neofunctionalist model to analyze the International 
Labor Organization.47  Leadership plays a major role in the neofunctionalist 
theory.   Instead of seeing the integration process as an unconscious act (as in 
functionalism), neofunctionalism holds that it depends for its impetus on the 
deliberate act of the leaders who are "willing and able to persuade member 
governments   that  unintended  consequences  may...   be  useful  for  the 
governments, and that the objectives of the [supranational] organization must 
therefore be shifted upward,"48 and that the shift upward "can be met only by 
strengthening the [supranational] organization."   The ILO paradigm has the 
objective of, in the pursuance of protecting and advancing labor standards and 
welfare, "claiming new powers and tasks, as the original task founders on spotty 
implementation by the member governments."49 The ILO, with the help of the 
trade union, identifies the employer as the adversary. The end result would be 
as follows: 
Disparate subgoals among trade unions and governments force an expansion 
and dilution of the program; as a result, the original ideology is strained, and can 
be restored only by redefinition at a more comprehensive level. The field of standard- 
setting thereby comes to include technical assistance for labor efficiency, 
protection of human rights and modernization of pre-industrial societies 
(emphasis added).50 
47Ernst B. Haas, Beyond the Nation-State:   Functionalism and International Organization 
(Stanford, CA:    Stanford University Press, 1964): 127.    Although Haas uses the term 
functionalism, later works on the subject label the Haas theory as neofunctionalism because it 
expanded on Mitran/s work.   See, Charles Pentland, International Theory and European 
Integration (New York: The Free Press, 1973): 101, and Nina Heathcote, "Neofunctional Theories 
of Regional Integration," in Functionalism: Theory and Practice in International Relations: 38. 




A recent journal article examined the actual impact of the ILO on the 
advancement of the modern welfare state.51 The research examined the 
conventions of the ILO in order to determine if they had an impact on the social 
welfare expenditures of a nation in the manner that Haas predicted.52 The 
results showed that for the majority of conventions, the Western industrialized 
nations followed the recommendations set forth by the ILO. The "ILO 
ratifications significantly increase welfare spending."53 The ILO's "apparent 
distance [from the national governments]/' the authors conclude, "permits the 
advocacy of rationalized policies, unsullied by parochial interests." Although the 
study concluded that the ILO did not completely fulfill the objectives set forth by 
Haas in his model, one can gather that the ILO has had an influence on members 
in their behavior relating to labor standards and welfare. The last point one can 
infer is that the critical aspect of "spill-over" seems to be missing from the 
modern ILO. There has not been a subsequent growth of related supranational 
organizations caused by the actions of the ILO. This lack of "spill-over" can be 
attributed to several factors: the reluctance of the United States to be an active 
participant, and the unwillingness of many of the member nations to let an 
outside organization have complete control over their labor standards. 
The value of neofunctionalism as a conceptual framework for 
understanding the integrative process of the EU is still being seriously assessed 
51
 David Strang and Patricia Mei Yin Chang, "The International Labor Organization and the 
welfare state: institutional effects on national welfare spending," International Organization 47, 
no. 2 (Spring, 1993): 235-262. 
52Messrs. Strang and Chang state that the convention, being supported by the member nations 
workers, employers and government officials, if ratified by the member nations' legislature, is, in 
effect, the same as an international treaty. 
53Strang and Chang, "The ILO:" 249.  The study states the coefficient of determination (the 
confidence of their model) was 82%, which is very good. Not surprisingly, the study stated that 
the United States was a welfare state "laggard." 
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by scholars.54 As a theoretical framework for the integration of nations, 
neofunctionalism displays political shortcomings which make it unusable for 
building a unified Europe. The first criticism is that the neofunctionalist model 
predicts a steady, gradual process of integration.55 Yet from 1950 to the present, 
the process of European integration has taken many turns. From the 
"Luxembourg Compromise" of 1966, the problems with the Maastricht Treaty's 
ratification in 1992-1993, the Exchange Rate Mechanism crisis of September 1992, 
to Norway's negative referendum regarding EU membership in 1994, the 
integration of the EU has proceeded with starts and stops. 
Another criticism states that the neofunctional reliance on empirical data 
to confirm the theory does not work.56 The neofunctionalists continue to gather 
data until the theory seems to "converge toward an increasingly complex and 
indeterminate ideal-typical description of the single case of the EC."57 The 
reason that the empirical testing does not consistently work, no matter what data 
is used or in what fashion, is that mathematical calculation cannot predict the 
occasional digression in human behavior.58 The "Luxembourg Compromise" 
54Andrew Moravcsik, "Preferences and Power in the European Community: A Liberal 
Intergovernmentalist Approach," Tournal of Common Market Studies 31, no. 4 (December 1993): 
478. 
55Ibid.: 476. 
56Andrew Moravcsik, "Preferences and Power in the European Community/' 476, and Charles 
Pentland, International Theory and European Integration:    146, and Nina Heathcote, 
Neofunctional Theories of Regional Integration," in A.J.R. Groom, Functionalism: 45. 
57Ibid.:476. 
58For an explanation of the unreliability of mathematical modeling on society, see Ludwig von 
Mises, Human Action: A Treatise on Economics 3r<* Edition (Chicago: Contemporary Books, 
Inc., 1966 [1949]): 200-231 and 350-357; F.A. Hayek, The Counter-revolution of Science: and 
Wilhelm Röpke, A Humane Economy: The Social Framework of the Free Market (New York: 
University Press of America, 1986 [1959]), especially 246-261. Röpke responds to the claim that 
mathematics provides precise answers in the social sciences by stating that: "In a science in 
which the subject matter simply precludes the exactness of mathematics and the natural sciences, 
such a claim is bound to raise the gravest misgivings. We reply that it is better to be imprecisely 
right than to be precisely wrong," (p. 249). 
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again illustrates this point. The neofunctionalists would have expected that the 
French would have wanted to agree with the other five members then in the EEC 
about the European Parliament because it was a natural progression from voting 
by unanimity to voting by qualified majority, and that it was rational. Yet the 
Gaullist attitude would always have put France before Europe where French 
sovereignty was concerned. 
The United Nations specialized agencies are cited by both the 
functionalists and the neofunctionalists as an example of their respective 
theories. The UN is claimed to offer a path for international integration that will 
cut across the bounds of the nation-state. The specialized agencies are seen to be 
primary examples of welfare-oriented organizations that can shift the allegiance 
of the peoples from the nation-state to the UN. But, recent trends in the UN 
make it clear that the non-accountability of an organization may offer 
opportunities for an abuse of that organization's position. 
The UN, until very recently, has had no inspector general, or an internal 
affairs department that is answerable to the Security Council, the General 
Assembly, or the General Secretary. As a result, many abuses of the system have 
occurred.59 At the least, the results represent a vast waste of money due to 
mismanagement and corruption; in the worst cases, the defects of the 
organization are claimed to have caused the death of untold thousands of 
refugees due to starvation from misappropriation of relief supplies.60 Since the 
specialized agencies are not answerable to anyone, the result is not a functional 
organization run by the experts and scientists, but bureaucracies that are 
59William Branigin, "The UN Empire, "The Washington Post (20-23 September, 1992). See also 
"The United Nations: Heart of Gold, Limbs of Clay," Jhejiconomist (12 June 1993): 21-24. Both 
articles suggest that the UN management system is extremely redundant and inefficient, and 
relies on a vast system of patronage, qualities not found in Mitran/s or Haas' philosophies. 
60
"William Branigin, "The UN Empire:" 1. 
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operated as self-perpetuating fiefdoms.61 Also contrary to the functionalist 
theory is the fact that UN organizations, once created to solve a problem, are 
never disbanded and never fade away. An example of this is the UN Trusteeship 
Council that manages the decolonization of territories. Of the eleven original 
territories, there is one left. Yet, the Trusteeship Council maintains a budget in 
excess of $9 million, "including more than $114,000 to send up to a nine person 
Visiting missions' to Palau for two weeks a year."62 There are other examples of 
special commissions originally set-up to perform a functional task, but that 
refuse to fade away once the task is complete.63 
Another aspect of the UN that does not shed a favorable light is the 
corruption. Across the African continent, there have been UN officials 
implicated in fraud, black marketeering, kickbacks and other devious enterprises. 
But due to the lack of oversight, the UN has a tendency to cover up the misdeeds, 
especially due to the influence of the regional "mafias."64 Although no single 
organization is ever without a single fault, if the organization is not answerable 
to the voters, or (in this case) to the member states, efficiency and accountability 
rapidly become non-existent. 
If the above characteristics are endemic to the UN and its specialized 
agencies, one can surmise that the same attributes will be assumed by future UN 
organizations, or by any autonomous supra- or international organization. A 
example of an organization that is currently being discussed is the Enterprise of 
the United Nations Convention of the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). The concept 
was originated by Ambassador Arvid Pardo of Malta in 1967 when he stated to 
61Ibid.: 2. 
62Ibid.,: 6. 
63This phenomenon is not just endemic to the UN, but to any large bureaucratic organization. 
64Ibid.: 12. 
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the UN General Assembly that the ocean seabed should be "the common 
heritage of humankind."65 To adequately allocate the resources of the seabed, 
the Seabed Commission proposed setting up an International Seabed Authority. 
This Authority would then allocate the seabed to be harvested by those who 
were able to do so, providing that the nations who did the harvesting 
redistributed the resources and proceeds from the harvest, in addition to sharing 
the technology with all members.66 "By establishing an international authority 
with an independent and vast source of revenue, the first substantial penetration 
would have been made of the wall of national sovereignty."67 Although many 
industrialized nations are against the provisions concerning the sharing of 
technology,68 some developing nations favor international agencies that would 
promote the leveling of national capital and wealth.69 
With the above evidence of the UN as a functional or neofunctional 
organization, one can see that the European Union does not fit into the 
framework of the two theories. The ideal of EU-determined social welfare 
standards makes both the functional and neofunctional approach extremely 
unattractive to prominent political elites in some of the EU members, especially 
65A. LeRoy Bennett, International Organizations: Principles and Issues, 5th Edition (Englewood 
Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1991): 321. 
66Ibid.: 324 
67Ibid.: 323. 68In fact, at the insistence of the United States, several of the more contentious issues were 
modified; but the treaty is still seen by many as "If s still 'Give me half of what you've got. Tell 
me everything you know." See William J. Broad, "Plan for Seabed Nears Fruition," New York 
Times (29 March 1994): B5-6. 
69For an excellent discussion on redistribution, see Bertrand de Jouvenal, The Ethics of 
Redistribution (Liberty Fund, 1990 [1952]). De Jouvenal sums up the ethos of the 
redistributionists by stating: "What is to be held against them is not that they are Utopian, it is 
that they completely failed to be so; it is not their excessive imagination, but their complete lack 
of it; not that they wish to transform society beyond the realm of possibility, but that they have 
renounced any essential transformation; not that their means are unrealistic, but that their ends 
are flat-footed. In fact, the mode of thought which tends to predominate in advanced circles is 
nothing but the tail-end of nineteenth-century utilitarianism." (p.48) 
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Britain. For example, it was Britain that "opted out" of the Social Chapter of the 
Maastricht Treaty. The reason given by Prime Minister Major was that once 
Brussels had authority to control the workplace in several limited fields, the 
Commission would then slowly expand its jurisdiction until Brussels would be 
dictating to Britons how they should work. Also, the fact that "decision-making 
is shifted to common institutions and bodies which cannot be controlled 
according to traditional democratic standards"70 runs counter to the entire 
political ethos of Western Europe. Haas' definition of political integration states 
that it is "the process whereby political actors in several distinct national settings 
are persuaded to shift their loyalties, expectations and political activities toward 
a new center, whose institutions possess or demand jurisdiction over the pre-existing 
national states."71 As stated before, power relinquished is seldom power 
returned. Once the nations surrender their sovereignty to either a set of 
community organizations, or a supranational organization, the national cultural 
and political identity that the EU members had will be in jeopardy. And if the 
Union were to fractionate due to some circumstance, then the former members 
would be extremely reluctant to reunite. Neofunctionalism runs into the same 
gamut of problems as functionalism in trying to predict the future cohesiveness 
of the European Union.72 
The initial desires of the functionalists and neofunctionalists are not 
predicated on an authoritarian philosophy; they seem rather to be based on the 
70Wolfgang Wessels, "Rationalizing Maastricht The Search For an Optimal Strategy of the New 
Europe," International Affairs 70, no. 3 (1994): 456. 
71
 Ernst Haas, The Uniting of Europe: Political, Social, and Economic Forces 1950-1957 Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 1958): 16. Emphasis added. 
72For an excellent work describing the deteriorating effects of social welfare and the "cult of the 
colossal" (the centralized omnipotent government), see Wilhelm Röpke, The Social Crisis of Our 
Time (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 1992 [1942]). 
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desire to help avoid violence and promote the welfare of others. As F.A. Hayek 
stated: 
To undertake the direction of the economic life of people with widely divergent 
ideals and values is to assume responsibilities which commit one to the use of 
force; it is to assume a position where the best intentions cannot prevent one 
from being forced to act in a way which to some of those affected must appear 
highly immoral.73 
With the decision-making to be left in the hands of a few technocrats, engineers 
and elites, and no accountability to the people because the "rusty gates" of a 
constitution are seen as a hindrance to efficiency, there would be an enormous 
tendency for the few to abuse their power. 
In a perfect world, a system based on the functionalist or neofunctionalist 
model could prove to be adequate, but the world is far from perfect. Nationalism 
and ethnic troubles will plague mankind for the foreseeable future, and it seems 
apparent that the idea of a universal, benevolent welfare community (for the 
functionalists) or a similarly inspired supranational organization (for the 
neofunctionalists) is an unobtainable objective.74 
Throughout history, one can see societies governed by the extremes, from 
the radical Jacobin democracy of the French Revolution, to the absolute 
totalitarianism of the Soviet Union. The purpose of a constitutional form of 
government is to make sure the pendulum stays in the middle, to be answerable 
to the people without the people themselves becoming a tyrannical majority. 
Unless qualified by robust constitutionalism, functionalism and 
neofunctionalism could lean towards centralized authoritarianism. The liberties 
of the nations and their citizens might be sacrificed at the altar of efficiency and 
73Friedrich A. Hayek, The Road to Serfdom (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1944): 
224. 
74See. for example. Henry Kissinger. Diplomacy (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1994): 804-835. 
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economic distribution. Such a system could not exist for very long in the 
European Union, because the commitment to democratic values and 
constitutionalism appears firm in the member states. Functionalism and 





Stripped of all its covering, the naked question is, whether ours is a federal or consolidated government; a 
constitutional or absolute one; a government resting ultimately on the solid basis of the sovereignty of the 
States, or on the unrestrained will of a majority; a form of government, as in all other unlimited ones, in 
which injustice, and violence, and force must finally prevail. 75 (föhn C. Calhoun) 
I—I ederalism, by definition, is the process by which states come into a union 
with each other, placing essential elements of the authority and sovereignty 
that used to be in the states, into a central authority. A prominent example of 
federalism in political integration is that of the United States. A European 
example is the Federal Republic of Germany. Other defining attributes of 
federalism are: a set of binding community laws, a budgetary process in the 
central authority's legislation, and a constitutional character in the institutions 
forming the federal bodies.76 A major characteristic of a federal government is a 
system of checks and balances. These checks and balances can consist of separate 
legislative, executive and judicial branches of government, as well as powers 
reserved to the individual units (e.g., the states) that make up a federal system. 
For federalism to function properly, these checks and balances need to be 
maintained. 
It is recognized by many scholars that the European Union is assuming a 
federal disposition.77 Some have argued that the EU, since the Maastricht Treaty 
on European Union, is a newly founded federation looking for a constitutional 
75John C. Calhoun, 'The Fort Hill Address:   On the Relations of the States and Federal 
Government, 26 July 1831," Ross, M. Lence, ed., Union and Liberty: The Political Philosophy of 
lohn C. Calhoun (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 1992): 383. 
76Alberta M. Sbragia "The European Community: A Balancing Act," Publius 23, no. 3 (Summer 
1993): 24, footnote 3. 
77Ibid.: 25. See footnote 7 on the same page for a short list of recent articles pertaining to the 
European Union in a federal framework. 
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foundation.78 Just as the United States Supreme Court became an important part 
of the checks and balances of the national government, so too has the European 
Court of Justice in asserting the precedence of EU law over national law, in areas 
where the EU has constitutional jurisdiction.79 One of the most difficult aspects 
of federalism is the division--or sharing--of sovereignty. If the state has any 
doubt as to the extent to which it would lose sovereignty, the impetus to enter 
into a federation will decline.80 
A. JAMES MADISON AND FEDERALISM 
James Madison is considered by many scholars to be the primary architect of 
the Constitution and the father of modern federalism.81 Madison, the "Father 
of the United States Constitution" and the author of twenty-nine of the essays 
comprising The Federalist Papers, contended that the sovereignty of the federal 
compact is dual in nature.82 
The proposed Constitution, therefore, even when tested by the rules laid 
down by its antagonists, is, in strictness, neither a national nor a federal 
Constitution, but a composition of both. In its foundation it is federal, not 
national; in the sources from which the ordinary powers of government are 
drawn, it is partly federal and partly national; in the operation of these powers, it 
is national, not federal; in the extent of them, again, it is federal, not national; 
and, finally, in the authoritative mode of introducing amendments, it is neither 
wholly federal nor wholly national.83 
78George A Bermann, 'Taking Subsidiarity Seriously: Federalism in the European Community 
and the United States," Columbia Law Review 94, no. 2 (March 1994): 455. 
79Alberta M. Sbragia "The European Community: A Balancing Act,": 34-36. The case referred to 
is Costa v. Entel. 
^Jeffrey T. Bergner, European Federal Union: The View From the American Convention of 1787 
Hudson Briefing Paper no. 143 (Indianapolis, IN: Hudson Institute, August 1992): 3. 
81George W. Carey, In Defense of the Constitution (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 1995 [1989]): 77. 
82James Madison, "Number 39: The Conformity of the Plan to Republican Principles:   An 
Objection to the Powers of the Convention Examined," in The Federalist Papers, Isaac Kramnick, 
ed., (New York:   Penguin Books, 1987 [17881): 254-259.  The federal government defined by 
Madison consists of the states, while the national government is the same as today's definition of 
the federal government. This thesis defines the central government as the national or general 
government, except where Carl Friedrich describes the federal government, with the modern 
definition (the national government). 
^Ibid.: 259. 
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Half of the sovereignty lies in the general government (or national authority), 
and half lies in the states (or the federal authority). To Madison, in order for the 
constitution to be effective, it must be "federal in foundation," that is, having the 
concurrence of the individual states participating in the federal compact. But, in 
the operation of general government, the authority rests in its national character, 
or the will of the aggregate.84 Therefore, in the operation of the European Union, 
according to the logic of Madison, the ratification of a constitution would depend 
upon the concurrence of all members; and the operation of the government 
would be under the influence of the aggregate of the EU, which resides in the 
European Parliament, the Council of Ministers, and other common institutions. 
Madison also stated that the greatest danger of disunion comes from the 
states having too much power and control over the central government.85 Within 
this framework of the potential abuse of power by the states, Madison advocated 
a constitution in which the national government would have the ultimate 
authority over the state governments.86 The first plan put forth by Madison at 
the Constitutional Convention was the Virginia Plan.87 The Virginia Plan was 
perhaps the most nationalistic plan to be put forth at the Convention; it called for 
the complete supremacy of the national government over the States. According 
to George Carey, Madison envisaged a national government "that could reach 
down into the distinctly internal affairs of the states."88 
^James Madison, Alexander Hamilton and John Jay The Federalist Papers ed. by Isaac Kramnick 
(New York: Penguin Books, 1987): 254-259, Federalist Number Thirty-Nine. 
85Ibid.: 293-302, in Federalist Numbers Forty-Five and Forty-Six. See also David M. O'Brien, 
"The Framers' Muse on Republicanism, the Supreme Court, and Pragmatic Constitutional 
Intrepretivism," The Review of Politics 53, no. 2 (Spring 1991): 251-288. 
86Ibid.: "Editor's Introduction," 29-30. It is interesting to note that James Madison, who wrote 
that the federal government should have a veto on the states, penned also, the Virginia 
Resolution calling for states' interposition against an unconstitutional law, the Alien and Sedition 
Acts; see Felix Morley, Freedom and Federalism (Indianapolis, IN: Liberty Fund, 1981): 243-244. 
87George W. Carey, In Defense of the Constitution: 83. 
SSlbid.: 82. 
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Madison's grounding for the Virginia Plan stemmed from his earlier 
writings, including Vices of the Political System of the United States and Of Ancient 
and Modern Confederacies.89 The Articles of Confederation, in Madison's view, 
were leading the United States into obscurity. The unanimity required of all the 
states led to ineffective decision-making, with the states holding the national 
government hostage to their whims. For Madison, the ultimate threat to the 
Union came not from the national government, but from the tendency of the 
"members to despoil the general government of its authorities, with a very 
ineffectual capacity in the latter [the national government] to defend itself against 
the encroachments."90 In order to prevent this, Madison put his support behind 
the mode of government that would give the preponderance of power to the 
national government.91 
At the Convention, after the demise of the Virginia Plan (due in large part 
to the recalcitrance of the smaller states),92 Madison soon realized that he would 
need to compromise in order to obtain a more effective government. The end 
result was the Connecticut Compromise, which provided that the states would 
have an equal voice in the legislature with the more democratically elected 
House of Representatives. When the Constitution was signed by the delegates, 
Madison's next task was to aid in its ratification. Part of the process included the 
penning of the Federalist Papers. 
89Alexander Landi, "Madison's Political Theory," The Political Science Reviewer 6, (Fall 1976): 
88-89. 
90James Madison, "Number 45: A Further Discussion of the Supposed Danger From the Powers 
of the Union to the State Governments," The Federalist Papers: 293. 
91For an excellent account of the turbulent period under the Articles of Confederation, see Forrest 
McDonald, E Pluribus Unum: The Formation of the American Republic. 1776-1790 (Indianapolis: 
Liberty Fund, 1979 [1965]), especially Chapters One through Four. 
92Ibid.: 277-307. 
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Madison attempted to allay the fears of the anti-federalists by arguing in 
Federalist Number Ten that the size of the constituencies and the physical size of 
the union would prevent the electorate from choosing unvirtuous people to sit in 
office, and that the electorate would naturally tend to choose well-suited people. 
Thus Madison coined the extended republic theory. But, if by chance, "men of 
factious tempers" happened to gain political office, the union was too expansive, 
and the factions too many, to allow the bad politicians gain control of a majority 
and thus to wreak havoc on the government and union. 
A rage for paper money, for an abolition of debts, for an equal division of 
property, or for any improper or wicked project, will be less apt to pervade the 
whole body of the Union than a particular member of it, in the same proportion 
as such a malady is more likely to taint a particular county or district than an 
entire State.93 
In dealing with the possible danger of tyrannical majorities, Madison stated that 
"the society itself will be broken into so many parts, interests and classes of 
citizens, that the rights of individuals, or of the minority, will be in little danger 
from interested combinations of the majority."94 
Madison's concept of the duality of sovereignty was unique at that time; 
and his concept of an extended republic differed from that of previous theorists, 
Madison held that the national government ought to hold final say over matters 
concerning the relations of the states and the national government.95 The 
Virginia Resolutions and the Report of 1800 were a brief interlude in Madison's 
political career concerning the powers of the national government. Madison's 
final statement on national and state relations came during the Nullification 
93James Madison, "Number 10: The Same Subject Continued," The Federalist Papers: 128. 
94Ibid.: 321, in Federalist Number Fifty-One. 
95See George W. Carey's In Defense of the Constitution, especially Chapter Four, 'lames 
Madison and the Principle of Federalism," for an excellent discussion of the different phases of 
James Madison's political philosophy on federalism during his career as a statesman. 
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Crisis of 1831-1833. During the Nullification Crisis, Madison, in defense of his 
position in favor of the national government, stated that no single state had the 
right to abrogate the constitution.96 Rather, Madison felt that the proper method 
for the states to gain redress from an encroachment by the national government 
would be to have several of the states come together, act in unison, and make 
their voice of disapproval heard.97 
When serious differences arise between the states and the national 
government, Madison argued, the Supreme Court is the body best equipped to 
settle the matter.98 Madison is said to have stated to Thomas Jefferson that the 
Constitutional Convention "intended the Authority vested in the Judicial 
Department as a final resort in relation to the States."99 Madison felt that if the 
Supreme Court did not have such authority over the states, the states could pass 
any law, and the Constitution would become, in effect, a dead letter.100 
According to David O'Brien, "Madison took the pragmatic view that 
constitutional interpretation involves 'practical judgment/ not 'solitary opinions 
as to the meaning of the law or the Constitution, in opposition to a construction 
reduced to practice during a reasonable period of time'."101 In other words, 
Madison is said to have endorsed liberal constructionism of the Constitution by 
the Courts in order to adapt it to the changing times. Madison felt that the check 
96Ibid.: 98. 
97Ibid.: 106. 
98Ibid.: 114. See also David M. O'Brien, "The Framers' Muse:" 270. 
"David M. O'Brien, "The Framers' Muse:" 275. 
100George W. Carey, In Defense of the Constitution:   114.   Both Carey and O'Brien quote 
Madison's remark to Edward Everett: "Those who had denied or doubted the supremacy of the 
judicial power of the U.S. seem not to have sufficiently adverted to the utter inefficiency of a 
supremacy in a law of the land, without a supremacy in the exposition and execution of the law." 
One should note, however, that Carey's thesis posits that the Supreme Court has gone beyond 
Madison's intentions, while O'Brien states that the Court is following the intent of Madison in its 
judicial activism. 
101David M. O'Brien, "The Framers' Muse:" 282. 
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on the judiciary (via impeachment as laid out in Art. II, sec. 4, U.S. Constitution) 
was sufficient to prevent any abuse of the station, so the court would not "be 
indulged in a career of usurpation to the decided opinions and policy of the 
Legislature."102 
1. Analysis of Madison's Theory of Federalism 
How does the federalism of the United States match the model of 
federalism set forth by Madison? The major problem, according to Madison's 
contemporaries, was that Madison put too much reliance on human virtue. 
Patrick Henry, "Brutus" and other anti-federalists held that the Constitution was 
not stringent enough to prevent the encroachment of the national government 
into the proper authority of the states. The anti-federalists realized that, if the 
states were not given an effective check on the national government, their 
authority and rights would be eroded. 
Patrick Henry, at the Virginia Ratification Convention, argued forcefully 
that the legislation of the Congress was consolidated in nature, leaving the states 
to tend to the most mundane of tasks:103 
But now, when we have heard the definition of it, it is purely national. The 
honorable member was pleased to say that the sword and purse included 
everything of consequence. And shall we trust them out of our hands without 
checks and barriers? The sword and purse are essentially necessary for the 
government. Every essential requisite must be in Congress. Where are the purse 
and sword of Virginia? They must go to Congress. What is become of your 
country? The Virginia government is but a name...We are, as a state, to form no 
part of the government. Where are your checks? The most essential objects of 
government are to be administered by Congress. How then, can the state 
governments be any check upon them?104 
102George W. Carey, In Defense of the Constitution: 121. The quote was in a letter from Madison 
to Spencer Roane, 6 May 1821. 
103Henry cited in Jonathan Elliot, ed., The Debates in the Several State Conventions on the 
Adoption of the Federal Constitution, as Recommended by the General Convention at 
Philadelphia in 1787, Volume HI, 2nd Edition (Philadelphia:  J.B. Lippincott Company, 1937 
[1836]): 171. This text will be referred to from now on as Elliofs Debates. 
104Ibid.: 385-396. 
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Patrick Henry's contention was that the states did not have any effective 
check on the powers of Congress. If Congress wants to encroach into the sphere 
of the state, the state has no recourse except to appeal to the Supreme Court. 
Upon this objection, as well as others, the Constitution was ratified on condition 
that a Bill of Rights would be added in the form of amendments to the 
Constitution. One of the end products was the Tenth Amendment, which stated 
that: "The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor 
prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the 
people." But, as one of the most cogent anti-federalists expositors opined, the 
power of the judiciary to interpret the Constitution might ultimately destroy any 
parchment barrier protecting the states.105 
The final five letters of "Brutus" were devoted primarily to the subject of 
judicial review.106 In Letter Number XI, "Brutus" stated that the "effect of this 
system of government" would be realized through the "medium of the judicial 
power."107 The Supreme Court is, from this perspective, not the "least 
dangerous" branch, but the branch capable of wielding the greatest power 
because "no errors they may commit can be corrected by any power, above them, 
if any such power there be, nor can they be removed from office for making ever 
105William Jeffery Jr., "The Letters of 'Brutus'-A Neglected Element in the Ratification Campaign 
of 1787-88," University of Cincinnati Law Review 40, no. 4 (1971): 643-777. See also Ann Stuart 
Diamond, "The Anti-Federalist 'Brutus,'" The Political Science Reviewer 6 (1976): 249-281. 
Jeffrey's article contains all sixteen of the "Brutus" letters. Both Diamond and Jeffery, although 
differing on the authorship of "Brutus," state that "Brutus" was the most effective of the anti- 
federalists. In particular, they describe the last five letters of Brutus as almost prophetic in 
predicting the course of the "least dangerous" of the federal branches. They also state that it was 
the letters of Brutus which made Hamilton pen the Federalist essays on the same subject, not to 
refute Brutus, but rather to lessen the impact of Brutus' accusations regarding the latent potential 
of the Supreme Court. 
106Although Hamilton wrote the majority of material on the Judiciary in the Federalist Papers, 
the subject will be briefly touched upon since the judicial branch is the third branch of the federal 
government, and Madison's views on the judiciary are said to be similar to Hamilton's. 
l07Ibid.: 739. 
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so many erroneous adjudications."108 "Brutus" added that the clause extending 
the judicial branch to all cases in "law and equity" would give the Supreme 
Court license to "explain the constitution according to the reason [and] spirit of 
it, without being confined to the words or letter."109 In other words, "Brutus" 
anticipated the "loose constructionism" of the court. "The opinions of the 
supreme court," "Brutus" added, "whatever they may be, will have the force of 
law" since it would become the last place of appeal. "Brutus" was making a 
prediction that came true on 29 September 1958, when the Supreme Court, in 
Cooper v. Aaron, ruled that "its interpretations of the written Constitution in a 
particular case in one State constitute the 'supreme law of the land'."110 
2. Contemporary Federalism as Compared with the Madisonian Model 
Modern analysis of the federal system seems to yield results similar to 
what the anti-federalists feared. The Constitution does provide an adequate 
check against the three branches comprising the national government, yet the 
states, relying on the Tenth Amendment and the good faith of federal officials, do 
not fare so well. Each of the branches of the national government is briefly 
examined here to determine the contemporary relevance of Madison's model. 
The Legislative branch, when in the ascendancy, can potentially cause the 
most harm to a federal system if left unchecked for the simple reason that it 
controls the purse strings and has the power to enact laws. An example of this 
occurred at the end of the Civil War when the Congress, led by Thaddeus 
Stevens as Speaker of the House, amended the Constitution with the Fourteenth 
108lbid. 
l09Ibid.: 741. 
n0Robert T. Donnelly, 'The Demise of Federalism: With Consent of the Governed?" in Edward 
B. McLean, ed., Derailing the Constitution:  The Undermining of American Federalism (Bryn 
Mawr, PA: Intercollegiate Studies Institute, 1995): 51-52. 
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and Fifteenth Amendments.111   Attached to each of the Amendments was the 
clause:   "Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate 
legislation." As Felix Morley states: 
Legislation written "to enforce" the Constitution appears itself to possess a 
certain constitutional sanction. If the executive vetoes such legislation he can be 
depicted as striking at the Constitution itself, an interpretation which in effect 
asserts that he has violated his oath of office and is therefore properly subject to 
impeachment.112 
Morley asserts that the Fourteenth Amendment was revolutionary due to the fact 
that it gave "Congress for the first time power to enforce, in all the States, rights 
as to which it had previously possessed no power to legislate."113 
The reason the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments were able to be 
ratified by the states was due to Steven's control of the Congress and the 
Reconstruction Act. When the Fourteenth Amendment initially came up for 
ratification by the States, it was overwhelmingly rejected by the southern states. 
After the initial failure, Stevens introduced the Reconstruction Act, which was 
vetoed by President Johnson. This veto was overridden by Congress. The 
Reconstruction Act stipulated that the southern states that had seceded were no 
longer states (even though they were admitted back into the Union upon 
ratification of the Thirteenth Amendment) and as such were placed under 
military rule. Once the military-appointed state legislatures ratified the 
Fourteenth Amendment, the states were allowed to return to the Union.114 When 
lllFelix Morley. Freedom and Federalism (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 1981 [1959]): 76-92. See 
also Raoul Berger, Selected Writings on the Constitution (Cumberland, VA: James River Press, 
1987), especially Chapter Seven. 
112Felix Morley, Freedom and Federalism: 77. One could also hypothesize that the Supreme 
Court would have a difficult time in checking the abuse of legislation wearing the guise of a 
constitutional amendment. 
113Ibid.: 86. 
114Felix Morley, Freedom and Federalism:   89-91.   After Johnson vetoed the Act, Stevens 
immediately brought impeachment proceedings to bear against him. Morley quotes Ulysses S. 
Grant: "no doubt [much of the legislation of the Reconstruction Act] was unconstitutional; but it 
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several of the southern states ratified with an attached dissenting opinion115 and 
two northern states withdrew their ratifications, the Congress passed a 
concurrent resolution declaring that the Amendment had been ratified by 
twenty-nine states. 
Franklin Roosevelt and his New Deal pre! ant the example of a presidency 
that has the upper-hand in the national government. During Roosevelf s tenure, 
the concept of the federal government assuming more responsibility for the 
welfare of individuals took root, further undermining the rights of the states.116 
The Roosevelt administration did more to centralize the authority of the states 
into the national government, and considerably extended the power of the 
executive branch.117 Gottfried Dietze claimed that any study of the national 
executive branch is a study in the aggrandizement of power.118 During the time 
of a national crisis, especially with a charismatic leader, the executive can quite 
easily assume the mantle of the supreme leader in order to be able to deal 
effectively with a problem. 
Among some of the acts introduced by Roosevelt to Congress were the 
New Deal Acts which were subsequently declared unconstitutional by the 
was hoped that the laws enacted would serve their purpose before the question of 
constitutionality could be submitted to the judiciary and a decision obtained." 
115The dissenting opinion, according to Morley, came from the members of the state legislatures 
who were in the minority in voting against the ratification of the amendment.  The opinion 
stated, in essence, that although the Amendment was ratified, it was ratified by a federally 
appointed legislature and not by the people of the states, (p. 91) 
^"Felix Morley, Freedom and Federalism: 149. See also Gottfried Dietze, America's Political 
Dilemma: From Limited to Unlimited Democracy (Baltimore: The John Hopkins Press, 1968): 
183-205. 
ll7Ibid.:   151.   According to Morley,   'The power thus vested in the White House and its 
subordinate agencies was of all sorts-political, economic and social—Political power was drained 
both from the State governments and from the Congress of the United States. Economic power 
was drained from business and banking, while social power, in the broad sense of the word, was 
taken from the localities and concentrated in the new network of alphabetical agencies." 
118Gottfried Dietze, America's Political Dilemma: From Limited to Unlimited Democracy: 184. 
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Supreme Court.119 Next, the President came forth with a proposal that, since the 
states could not provide adequate pay for the agriculture and labor sectors, the 
national government would assume responsibility.120 In view of the dire 
economic problems facing the country, Roosevelt had no problem in getting 
Congress to pass the legislation he proposed. 
After the Supreme Court decision regarding the constitutionality of the 
NRA, Roosevelt attempted to "pack the Court" by introducing legislation that 
would force the retirement of Federal judges and have the President appoint 
replacements.121 This would allow Roosevelt to pass the legislation the he 
desired without any fear of a Supreme Court declaring the legislation 
unconstitutional. After the failure of the "court-packing" episode, it is said that 
the onset of World War II was what saved Roosevelt from defeat in the next 
election.122 Once World War II was over, the centralization that occurred during 
the crises of the previous ten years did not go away, owing in part to the onset of 
the Cold War. 
The judicial branch has also gone through stages that have allowed it to 
gain ascendancy over the other two branches. Chief Justice John Marshall 
commenced the process of judicial review in Marbury v. Madison,123 which stated 
that the Supreme Court is the "ultimate interpreter of the Constitution" and that 
119Felix Morley, Freedom and Federalism:  155-157.  The National Recovery Act (NRA) was 
struck down because 'Its price- and wage-fixing provisions were of course in direct contradiction 
to the anti-trust laws, as Mr. Roosevelt himself was compelled to admit" 
120Ibid.: 157. "But by the half-truth of pinning inability to do the impossible on the States alone, 
Mr. Roosevelt neatly impugned the whole theory of federal government and strongly suggested 
that he personally would provide these benefits..." 
121
 Ibid. Raoul Berger posits that Roosevelt could have avoided the "Court-Packing" scheme by 
just having the Congress limit the judicial review power of the Supreme Court via Article in of 
the Constitution, a suggestion which seems highly dubious. See Raoul Berger, Congress v. The 
Supreme Court (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1969): 291-292. 
122Felix Morley. Freedom and Federalism:   160. 
123Raoul Berger, Selected Writings on the Constitution: 65. 
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it is the responsibility of the court to define the boundaries set forth in the 
Constitution. Robert T. Donnelly contends that there are two watershed cases 
whereby the court stripped power away from the states, as well as the other two 
branches in the national government.124  The first case was Cooper v. Aaron, in 
which the Supreme Court decreed its interpretations to be the "supreme law of 
the land."   The second case was Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit 
Authority, where the decision was that "Congress is free under the Commerce 
Clause to assume a state's traditional sovereign power, and to do so without 
judicial review of its action."125 The results of the two decisions, according to 
Donnelly, are as follows: 
(1) Under the Cooper assertion and the Incorporation Doctrine, the Court will sit 
as a Council of Revision over the states; (2) the Court will no longer defend the 
states against action taken by Congress under the aegis of the Commerce Clause; 
and (3) if Congress should undertake to address the parameters of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, the Court will decide if its articulations are right and good .126 
By emphasizing the words "right and good," Donnelly is contending that the 
Supreme Court no longer makes its decisions using as a framework the 
Constitution and the original intent of its authors, but the contemporary political 
views of the Court Justices. 
124Robert T. Donnelly, "The Demise of Federalism: With Consent of the Governed?": 50-60. 
Donnelly's essay contends that there were three key events, two of which involved Supreme 
Court; the other event was the ratification of the Seventeenth Amendment, which stipulated the 
election of U.S. Senators by popular vote, instead of through the state legislatures. It can be 
argued that this was not a watershed event for two reasons. First, the Amendment was ratified by 
at least three-fourths of the states, without the coercion that occurred with respect to the 
Fourteenth Amendment, and the states, and the citizens thereof, had at least a modicum of 
knowledge of the ramifications of the Amendment. Secondly, in the field of original intent, quite 
a few of the Framers were against the idea of putting the Senators above the direct reach of the 
voters; the Connecticut Compromise was a last minute effort to achieve a consensus at the 
Convention. See Forrest McDonald, E Pluribus Unum: 276-307. 
125Robert T. Donnelly, "The Demise of Federalism: With Consent of the Governed?": 54. 
126Ibid.: 58. Emphasis in the original. 
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Raoul Berger, an eminent constitutional historian, has provided an 
excellent account of the rise of judicial activism, especially in the past half 
century.127 Berger gives as evidence six instances in which (according to his 
analysis) the Supreme Court overstepped its constitutional boundaries: Bridges v. 
California, The Reapportionment Cases, Brown v. Board of Education, Williams v. 
Florida, Shapiro v. Thompson and the Death Penalty Cases.128 In each of these 
cases, the sphere intruded in is that of state sovereignty. Berger has declared that 
the continuance of this process is due to "the doctrine of judicial squatter 
sovereignty-usurpation is legitimated by long-standing repetition."129 In 
Berger's view, the court has taken over decision-making that was, under the 
Constitution, to be left to the legislative branch and the states; and Congress and 
the Executive have accepted these rulings.130 
There are two main trends noted in the above analysis. First, the tension 
in the national government between the three branches has been fairly stable for 
the past two hundred years. The one branch that seems to have gained more 
power over the other two is the Judicial Branch. That is not to say that the other 
two branches did not also aggrandize their own power; they did so, at the cost of 
the sovereignty of the states. The erosion of state rights has been a steadily 
evolving process. Madison was correct in stressing the need for a separation of 
powers in the national government. But since the states did not have the power 
127Ibidv Chapter XH, "The Activist Legacy of the New Deal Court:" 263-291. 
128Ibid.: 266-273. Emphasis in the original. 
129Ibid.: 266. 
130George W. Carey, In Defense of the Constitution: 137. Carey adds: "And, because of the new 
morality concerning the sanctity of the Court, there is no one, not even the President, to say it 
'nay.' To do so would create a political turmoil of immense proportions." 
42- 
of redress to prevent encroachment of the national government in the 
Constitution, their initial authority was greatly reduced.131 
B. CARL FRIEDRICH AND FEDERALISM 
/\ twentieth century federal theorist, Carl Friedrich, defines federalism as the: 
process by which a number of separate political communities enter into 
arrangements for working out solutions, adopting joint policies, and making joint 
decisions on joint problems,...132 
Friedrich makes clear from the outset that state sovereignty (in the sense of the 
political autonomy of the component units) does not exist in a federal system.133 
The sovereignty of a nation, upon entering the federation, dissolves into what 
Friedrich describes as "constituent power." The duality of sovereignty that 
Madison championed in Federalist Number Thirty-Nine is therefore a non sequitur 
in Friedrich's conceptual framework. Therefore, if the sovereignty is not 
dualistic134, and does not reside in the states, then logically it must be based in 
the national government. Friedrich makes a distinction between autonomy and 
sovereignty; he seems to define autonomy as a characteristic that enables the 
"constituents" to have a say in the matters of the federation. No single entity is 
131
 John Taylor of Caroline in Tyranny Unmasked (Indianapolis, IN: Liberty Fund, 1992 [1822]), 
put it succinctly: "[suppose] that the first Congress under the present constitution, had published 
a declaration in the following words: Congress has power to assume the State debts...to model 
State constitutions, to legislate internally without restriction,...No State can pass any law which 
shall contravene a law of Congress. No State possess a right of self-defence against 
encroachments of the Federal government. The Supreme Court can abrogate any State law and 
reverse any State judgment. It can regulate and alter the division of powers between the States 
and Federal governments; and it can constitutionally execute unconstitutional Federal laws by 
which State rights are infringed...Yet all these blows have been successively given to our theory; 
proving that the gradual and piecemeal mode of destroying it [the constitution], and for 
substituting a tyranny in its place, is the most dangerous because it is the least alarming" (pp. 
210-211). 
132Carl J. Friedrich, Trends of Federalism in Theory and Practice (New York: Frederick A 
Praeger, 1968): 7. 
133Ibid.: 8. Friedrich states that "[n]o sovereign can exist in a federal system." 
134Friedrich calls the Madisonian concept a "constitutional myth." 
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to have the "last word;"135 therefore sovereignty is not an issue. Friedrich then 
states that federalism is an evolutionary process that goes through several 
distinct stages. 
The first stage is "dual federalism;" this stage seems to be marked by a 
distinct separation between the participating entities and the central authority.136 
The second stage is labeled "centralizing federalism;" in this stage, a certain 
amount of "autonomy" is transferred from the component entities to the central 
authority. The third stage is "cooperative federalism." Friedrich defines this as 
"a design in which both federal and state authorities resume a policy of extending 
governmental control and regulation, and, in doing so, were pushed to 
collaborate in the execution of those policies."137 The last stage that Friedrich 
provides is labeled "creative federalism." This stage is marked by a mobilization 
of "private interests as well as public agencies in intergovernmental affairs."138 
Indeed, Friedrich states that federalism in the United States has undergone 
a process of centralization, with the major dominance emerging on the side of the 
national government. This process was caused by three factors: the Supreme 
Court's broad interpretation of the Constitution (and also, one can argue, its 
judicial activism), the federal legislation slowly encroaching on the states' 
reserved powers (Friedrich calls the reserved powers the residual powers), and 
what Friedrich calls the "exertions" of the federal executive.139 This process was 
greatly accelerated after the Civil War, and carried even further with the Wilson 
135ibid. 
136Ibid. Friedrich, unfortunately, does not give definitions to the stages. Instead, he attaches the 
stage to a period of history and leaves it to the reader to discover what the definition is. 
13Mbid.: 27. Emphasis in the original. 
138Ibid. 
139Friedrich, Trends of Federalism: 23. One could make the case that the process whereby the 
loyalty of the citizens shifted exclusively to the federal government, from 1930 onwards, was an 
example of functionalism. 
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administration's "New Freedom/'140 the New Deal of Franklin D. Roosevelt, and 
the "Great Society" of Lyndon B. Johnson. 
According to Friedrich, four factors determine the character of the federal 
order: nationalism, economic activity, religion and class structure.141 
Nationalism is defined as the national feeling of what constitutes a Frenchman, a 
Briton or a German. Friedrich states that federalism "provides the only 
voluntary approach to the task of coordinating disparate national elements."142 
The proper representation of the member in the federal system is "by providing 
channels for inter-group communications, by delaying precipitate action and 
offering a stage for inter-group compromise."143 Friedrich furthers explains that 
a "federal order is the only way to protect"144 the cultural and social uniqueness 
of each member. 
The problem of economic activity is defined as different areas having 
predominantly different types of economies. For example, industrialized 
northern Europe differs from agrarian southern and eastern Europe. Friedrich 
leaves class structure undefined, except to the extent that he refers to the federal 
order being able to reconcile differences between "peasants," "landlords," and 
the like.145 The problem of religion is self-evident, and as Friedrich points out, 
this category can be the cause of great conflict under certain conditions. The 
main solution proffered by Friedrich to all of these problems is to shift the 
boundaries of the federal members so as to lessen the impact of the problem on 








industrial sector had a predominance over the agrarian sector; in that way, 
Friedrich would argue, the agrarian interests would have appropriate 
representation in government.146 The same problem-solving solution could be 
applied to the area of religion as well, according to Friedrich. 
The operation of the federal system can be of either two modes, explains 
Friedrich. The first mode is "delegated administration,"147 and the second is 
"centralized administration." Friedrich does not go into an explanation of the 
"centralized administration," but one can surmise that it is a federalism that 
gives little authority to its members. The "delegated administration," on the 
other hand, offers three advantages: it avoids duplication, local agencies apply 
federal legislation, and the national government draws on the expertise of the 
local governments.148 The decisions made by the national government are to be 
handed to the local governments to be executed, provided that the local 
governments execute the federal laws to the satisfaction of the national 
government. Friedrich states that "safeguards are needed to ensure that the 
federal supervision does not turn into control of the local sphere of competence 
and jurisdiction."149 
Friedrich holds that a federation can only be truly successful if it has a 
"federal spirit" or "federal behavior."150 This spirit is defined as a tendency to 
want to compromise in order to keep the greater good, the federal compact, in 
good order; this is also called "federal comity,"151 or the willingness to 









also a major point of contention in the Maastricht Treaty) is social planning. 
Friedrich states that the national government could, and indeed should, "give 
guidance and coordination of the community's economic activities." This 
guidance is to come in the form of "an over-all program" which is mandated by 
the popularly elected representatives.152 Friedrich conducted many case studies 
of federalism, but this thesis limits its analysis to the case study of European 
federalism. 
1. "United Europe - An Emergent Federal Order?" 
Friedrich treats the European case as a special case for the student of 
federalism.153 The essential factor that Friedrich touches upon is the fact that the 
Europeans cannot achieve economic union without first achieving political 
union, and as yet there are no federal bodies within the European 
Community.154 The path to a federal Europe, Friedrich contends, has been a 
process of starts and stops. Political and economic factors are holding up the 
federalizing process, while the cultural aspects tend to promote to a more unified 
Europe.155 
Friedrich argues that Europe is becoming more unified at the "grass roots" 
level, where the common attitude includes hopes for a united "Europe with a 
common citizenship and common foreign and security policy." These grass roots 
level organizations, while displaying "loose bonds," are important, because they 
break down the barriers of national sovereignty.156 The concept of sovereignty is 
seen as an "outworn" issue that is not effective in solving the problems of society. 
152Ibid.: 42. 
153Ibid.: 156. 
154Ibid.:  157.  See also Josef Joffe, "The New Europe: Yesterday's Ghosts,"  Foreign Affairs 
(1993): 29-43; Wilhelm Röpke, "European Economic Integration and its Problems," Modem Age 
(Summer 1964): 231-244 for similar viewpoints. 
155Carl Friedrich. Trends of Federalism: 158. 
156Ibid.: 159 
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Friedrich contends that, "if sovereignty is allowed to intrude itself into the 
federal relationship in its old absolute sense of an unlimited competence to 
determine its own range of competencies, as is de Gaulle's inclination, then it 
becomes destructive to the federal relationship."157 Sovereignty is seen as a 
characteristic of a "weak federal spirit." The European Community at the time of 
Friedrich's analysis (the late 1960's) resembled the period in which the German 
principalities were reluctant to join in a federation with Prussia under the rule of 
Bismarck.158 Friedrich concludes that the European Community will not be 
successful until it widens its federal membership. 
2. Analysis of Friedrich's Theory of Federalism 
Friedrich is eloquent regarding the broad philosophical reasons why 
nations should federate. "It [federalizing] unites without destroying the selves 
that are uniting and is intended to strengthen them [the member states]."159 But 
an essential element is missing: protection of state sovereignty. All through his 
discourse, Friedrich contends that sovereignty is a "nebulous concept" that only 
hinders the process of federalization. Friedrich argues that federalization needs 
to come from the will of the people, yet he also states that boundaries need to be 
redrawn in order to prevent a majority interest from forming. 
Several inconsistencies should be mentioned in this regard. First, 
Friedrich states that the shifting of boundaries can solve the problems of 
economic and religious differences. Yet it would seem that no nation would shift 
its borders within the federal system voluntarily; and it is the voluntary nature of 
the federal system which sets it apart from an empire. The second inconsistency 








solve one problem, but cause additional problems. For example, if the boundary 
of one country was changed to take in the industrial sector of another (e.g., 
hypothetically, the Saarland going to France to increase Frances's industrial 
sector), the people of the Saarland would then be a cultural and religious 
minority in France. Friedrich makes the statement that West Germany made 
internal boundary changes at the end of World War II to lessen problems of 
economic and cultural differences, but one must remember that West Germany 
was then under military rule, and the federal system was not necessarily a 
voluntary coming together of the Länder. 
The case study offers an accurate depiction of the evolution of the 
European Community. Yet Friedrich's thoughts on the future of European 
federalism sound a bit like neo-functionalism (discussed in the previous chapter). 
"It is possible to let such a relationship [the federalizing of the EEC] evolve, and 
to solve specific problems as they emerge."160 To give the federation a 
permanent form is to prevent the pragmatic problem-solving of the present 
issues. Friedrich's "cooperative federalism" is defined as political centralization 
by others.161 Another inconsistency is apparent in Friedrich's argument that 
Germany overcame similar problems of federalization in the late nineteenth 
century. Germany under Bismarck was not, however, an example of the 
popularly mandated federalism that Friedrich advocates. "German Unity had 
not come...'from below7, but by a treaty between princes, 'from above'."162 
160Ibid.: 159. 
161
 Friedrich's labels the New Deal as "cooperative federalism," while Felix Morley describes it as 
one of the greatest instances of political centralization and nationalization in United States 
history. See Felix Morley, Freedom and Federalism (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 1981 [1959]). 
162Arno Kappler, Ariane Grevel,, eds., Gerard Finan, trans., Facts About Germany (Frankfurt, 
Societät-Verlag, 1993): 90. 
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Friedrich adheres to federalism as one of the few political methods-if not 
the only one-to bring about the integration of members while at the same time 
preserving the distinctive social and cultural values that the members bring into 
the federal system. Yet, at the same time, Friedrich argues that the members are 
to have limited autonomy in that they will only be able to carry out federal laws. 
The members are expected to show loyalty to the over-all needs of the 
federation.163 Problems can be overcome by more "cooperation" from the federal 
members and the national government. 
C CONCLUSION 
l-Coth Madison and Friedrich, display ambivalence regarding the ultimate 
protection of the rights of the states operating in the federal compact. 
Friedrich makes the assertion that the states surrender all sovereignty in 
exchange for "constituent power." The national government is the ultimate 
arbitrator in matters legislative and judicial.164 The dualistic nature of the 
Madisonian model is easily supplanted by a more centralized government 
during times of national stress. As history has shown, once power is given to the 
national government during crises (e.g., the Civil War, World Wars I and II, and 
the Great Depression), the national government is extremely hesitant to 
relinquish the powers and restore them to the states. When scholars examine the 
case of the United States, they generally see the pattern of an erosion of state 
sovereignty until, over time, the state's role is substantially diminished, and the 
163Ibid.: 175. 
164A.V. Dicey and Raoul Berger both state that in the area of judicial review, the states have just 
as much authority to declare federal laws unconstitutional as does the Supreme Court. But since 
the states did not have this role explicitly delineated in the Constitution, the Supreme Court 
quickly supplanted that position. See A.V. Dicey, An Introduction to the Study of the 
Constitution (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 1982 [1885]): 88 ; and Raoul Berger, Congress v. the 
Supreme Court (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1967): 258. 
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State serves as an administrative unit of the national government, at least for 
some purposes. 
With the tradition of national sovereignty firmly entrenched in the ethos 
of many Europeans, the idea of a federation in which today's nations would be 
reduced to administrative units is extremely distasteful. This became apparent 
after the signing of the Maastricht Treaty. The citizens of the nations, once they 
became cognizant of the potential loss of sovereignty, became increasingly 
ambivalent towards the treaty, despite efforts by the national heads of 
government to reassure them that the Treaty would not affect their national 
interests. 
In the 1996 Maastricht review conference, the trepidations of the European 
citizens will come to the forefront once again. If they are not reassured that the 
formation of an ever-closer union will not irrevocably steal away their national 
sovereignty and identity either outright or like a "thief in the night," the prospect 
that some of the member nations would simply walk away from the union, or 
that the union would fall short of its professed objectives, with some members 
claiming a "liberum veto," is great. 
The U.S. experience with federalism suggests that the central government 
tends to gain power at the expense of the states. This experience may not be 
particularly encouraging to citizens of nations in the European Union who 
remain attached to national autonomy and sovereignty—hence, the opposition to 
federalism that some articulate, notably in the United Kingdom. 
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IV.  THE THEORY OF CONCURRENT MAJORITY 
Let it never be forgotten, that power can only be opposed by power, organization by organization: and on 
this theory stands our beautiful federal system of Government.165 (John C. Calhoun) 
Tn the first half of the nineteenth century, there arose a statesman from South 
Carolina, who, according to the vast majority of historians, was the greatest 
political-philosopher and statesman in the period. The man was John Caldwell 
Calhoun. Intellectually, Calhoun had no peer in or out of government. With his 
studies in logic and rhetoric at Waddell's Academy, combined with the 
education at Yale and Litchfield Law School, Calhoun trained his gifted mind 
into an analytic tool to develop probably the most innovative theory of a 
representative system of government in American history.166 
The focus of this chapter will be the political philosophy of John C. 
Calhoun as it pertains to states-rights, sovereignty and minority representation 
and protection. Richard Hofstadter, in The American Political Tradition, stated that 
Calhoun's "concepts of nullification and the concurrent voice have little more 
than antiquarian interest for the twentieth-century mind."167 Yet, it is this very 
concept of minority protection and representation in the political arena that is 
attracting attention. As one observes the political landscape in Europe, one can 
165John C. Calhoun, "Speech on the Revenue Collection [Force] Bill, 15-16 February 1833," Union 
and Liberty: 453-454. 
166Russell Kirk, The Conservative Mind: From Burke to Eliot, 7th Revised Edition (Chicago: 
Regnery Books, 1987). Kirk adds that Calhoun's Disquisition was "one of the most sagacious and 
vigorous suggestions ever advanced by American conservatism" (p. 181). Vemon L. Parrington's 
Main Currents in American Thought, Volume II: 1800-1860 - The Romantic Revolution in 
America (Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 1987), agrees with Kirk in that he ranks 
Calhoun with John Adams as one of the greatest original American political thinkers. Parrington 
adds that of the three great political leaders from 1812 to 1850: Daniel Webster, Henry Clay and 
John Calhoun, Calhoun "proved himself intellectually the greatest of the three" (p. 69). See also 
William D. Peterson, The Great Triumvirate: Webster, Clay and Calhoun (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1987). 
167Richard Hofstadter, The American Political Tradition: And The Men Who Made It (New York: 
Alfred A. Knopf, 1962): 68. 
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see that the concept of representation in government and the protection of 
minority rights is at the forefront of political thought. As is evident from the 
recalcitrance of a growing number of people in European Union countries 
regarding the aim of "an ever closer union/' statesmen are still struggling with 
the conundrum of maintaining an effective and cohesive political entity while 
allowing the sovereignty of the parts to remain intact. 
The chapter is not intended to cover the earlier period of Calhoun's 
political career as a Congressional War Hawk and Secretary of War. The chapter 
first discusses the roots of Calhoun's ideas on states-rights and sovereignty, and 
then turns to the events in his career which had the greatest impact on his views 
(e.g., the "Patrick Henry/Onslow" Debates and the Nullification Crisis of 1833). 
It is important to examine the events that shaped Calhoun's ideals, for they 
reveal how practical experiences helped to formulate the theory of concurrent 
majority. Finally, Calhoun's political philosophy, as expressed in his Disquisition 
on Government and Discourse on the Constitution and Government of the United 
States, is analyzed. The chapter concludes with a discussion of the significance of 
Calhoun's writings for contemporary European politics. 
Calhoun's interest in decentralized government probably stemmed from 
the influence of his father, Patrick Calhoun. Patrick Calhoun, a Scotch-Irish 
immigrant, settled in the upcountry of South Carolina in the latter half of the 
eighteenth century, becoming a leading figure in the community, including 
politics. As a representative in the South Carolina ratifying convention, Patrick 
Calhoun voted against the United States Constitution, arguing that it was not 
right for politicians outside the state to have the power to tax people in the state. 
It was also Patrick Calhoun who was instrumental in obtaining representation for 
the upcountry citizens in the lower chamber of the state legislature. The legacy 
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of Patrick Calhoun, as well as the culture "based on faith in family farms and 
family Bibles, in the dignity of individuals and the indignity of class distinction, 
in close-knit communities, militant morality, and uninhibited free enterprise," 
shaped Calhoun's philosophy.168 The republican ethos of small government and 
the liberty of the individual was thus communicated to Calhoun from the earliest 
age. 
A. THE PATRICK HENRY/ONSLOW LETTER CONTROVERSY 
| alhoun's first pointed stand on the strict construction of the Constitution 
occurred in 1826 with the "Patrick Henry/Onslow Letters." The letters 
were a series of debates between Calhoun (under the pseudonym of "Onslow," a 
famous orator in the British House of Commons) and Philip Fendall, "a clerk in 
the Department of State who wrote with [President John Quincy]Adam's 
blessing" (under the pseudonym 'Tatrick Henry")- The letters appeared in 
various Washington newspapers.169 
The debate arose from the duel between Henry Clay, the Secretary of 
State, and Senator John Randolph of Roanoke, Virginia.170 "Patrick Henry," in 
the opening salvo, declared that Calhoun, as President of the Senate, had failed 
utterly in his duties in not calling Randolph to order for his remarks and 
accusations against the President and Secretary of State. The ensuing debate was 
thus said to have taken place on two levels of thought. The first level was 
common sense. 'Tatrick Henry" was correct, according to Jefferson's manual of 
168Irving Barteltt, Calhoun: A Biography (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1993): 21. 
169Ibid.: 134 
170The duel was the result of a speech by Randolph in which he made the remark that President 
Adams and Secretary Clay were engaged in a "corrupt bargain" and that the two made a 
coalition akin to "Blifil and Black George...the puritan with the black leg." (The speech can be 
found in Russell Kirk Tohn Randolph of Roanoke (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 1978): 439-472). 
The name "black leg" was apparently repugnant enough for Clay to call Randolph to a duel, 
which ended without injury to the parties involved. 
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parliamentary proceedings for the Senate, that Calhoun should have done 
something to prevent Randolph from excoriating Adams and Clay . The second 
level, and the level where Calhoun displayed his mastery on the subject, was that 
on the philosophical meaning of implied and expressly delegated powers. 
"Patrick Henry's" argument on the implied powers was that "the power of 
preserving order, and repressing irregularity, are constitutionally attached to the 
office of President of the Senate by the People who created that office."171 This 
meant that the Senate, although allowed by the Constitution to determine its own 
proceedings, was placed under the ultimate control of the Vice President, acting 
as President of the Senate. "Patrick Henry" thus summarizes: 
1st. That the power and duty of preserving order are constitutionally attached to 
the office of the President of the Senate, by the People who created that office. 
2nd. That the Senate, whatever else it may do under the clause of the 
Constitution, authorizing it to "to determine the rules of its proceedings," cannot 
devest [sic] its presiding officer of this power, nor exempt him from this duty. 
3rd. That the Senate has never attempted to do so, but on the contrary, has borne 
testimony to the Constitutional character of that officer.172 
"Patrick Henry" then gave examples in the history of the British House of 
Commons, as well as the House of Representatives, to defend his assertion that 
the Vice President had the authority over the Senate that the Speaker had over 
the House of Representatives. 
Calhoun, as "Onslow," in his rebuttals, asserted that nowhere in the 
Constitution was it stated that the Vice President had express authority to call to 
order Senators in the course of debate. The President of the Senate "has no 
inherent power whatever, unless that of doing what the Senate may prescribe by 
171
'Tatrick Henry, published on August 5,1826" in The Papers of Tohn C. Calhoun, Volume X 
Robert O. Meriwether, Edwin W. Hemphill, and Clyde N. Wilson et al, eds. (Columbia S.C.: 
University of South Carolina Press, 1978): 175. This title will be referred to from now on as the 
Calhoun Papers. The introduction to Volume X offers an excellent analysis of the Debates. 
172Ibid.: 184. 
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its rules, be such a power. There are, indeed, inherent powers, but they are in the 
body, and not in the officer."173 Calhoun stated that the Vice President, as a ruler 
of the Senate, would tear down the separation of powers in the government that 
the founding fathers had so wisely erected.   The Vice President, not being 
answerable to the Senate, could then control the manner of debate to prevent the 
body from debating anything contrary to the Executive Branch. 
You thus introduce the President, as it were, into the Chamber of the Senate, and place 
him virtually over the deliberation of the body, with powers to restrain discussion, and 
shielding his conduct from investigation.^^ 
Calhoun considered the liberties gained by the separation of powers too 
precious to be sacrificed for the exigencies of the moment. To Calhoun, the only 
way to protect the separation of powers was to adhere strictly to the 
Constitution; not, as 'Tatrick Henry" advocated, to imply that the Vice President 
has supreme power over the body. "Patrick Henry" even went so far as to add 
that the Senate (and House) should always have committees favorable to the 
views of the administration, for it is the administration that has the "wisest and 
most patriotic suggestions" concerning the plans for "public welfare."175 
Calhoun concluded the series of debates by stating that: first, the Vice 
President receives his presiding powers from the Senate, not from his position as 
the Vice President. Secondly, that "the rules themselves must determine, not 
only whether the power exists, but in what manner; for it is just as illegal to 
exercise power in a manner different from what it is delegated, as it is to exercise 
that not delegated at all."176 Calhoun argued that loose construction of the 
Constitution would ultimately result, not only in the loss of the Senate as an 
173
"Onslow to Patrick Henry, Published on 27 June, 1826," Calhoun Papers, Volume X: 139. 
174Ibid.: 145. Emphasis in the original. 
175
"Patrick Henry, Published on 8 August, 1826," in Calhoun Papers, Volume X: 191. 
176
"Onslow to Patrick Henry, published on 7 October, 1826," in Calhoun Papers, Volume X: 211. 
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independent deliberative body serving as a check on the Executive and the 
House, but also in a loss of liberty to the People. 
The man responsible for the debates, John Randolph, was the one person, 
who, as Calhoun's peer, had the greatest influence in converting Calhoun from 
National Republicanism to States-Rights Republicanism.177 Randolph, the 
eccentric genius from Virginia, was the leader and orator of the Tertium Quid 
(The Third Factor) or Old Republicans. Randolph, along with John Taylor of 
Caroline,178 led the statesmen in the first part of the nineteenth century that 
adhered strictly to the precepts of the agrarian-republican, anti-federalist 
Founding Fathers; they had a deep belief in strict adherence to the Constitution. 
Echoing the anti-federalist "Brutus,"179 Randolph argued that the greatest threat 
for the Federal Republic was the broad interpretation of the Constitution. 
Randolph was vehemently against using the needs of the moment, be it to build 
roads for internal improvements or to create a Bank of the United States, as an 
excuse to by-pass the proper boundaries set forth by the Constitution. Although, 
177Russell Kirk, lohn Randolph of Roanoke: A Study in American Politics (Indianapolis: Liberty 
Fund, 1978): 99. This book contains many of Randolph's most important letters and speeches. 
Kirk adds that this process actually started in 1816, when Randolph made his Speech on the 
Treaty Making Power, on January 10,1816; see also pp. 100-115. Kirk here quoted Charles W. 
Wiltse in Tonn C. Calhoun. Nationalist (Indianapolis, 1935) in stating "Randolph's answer was 
one which Calhoun passed over at the time, but to which he paid tribute many years later." Kirk 
also uses Henry Adams as a source by stating that "John Randolph stands out in history as the 
legitimate and natural precursor of Calhoun." See Henry Adams, Tohn Randolph (Boston and 
New York, 1882). 
l78If Randolph was considered the orator for the Tertium Quid, John Taylor was considered the 
theoretician and writer for the group. Some of Taylor's works on the subject include: 
Constructions Construed and Constitutions Vindicated (Richmond: Shepherd and Pollard, 1820), 
New Views of the Constitution of the United States (Washington: Way and Gideon, 1823), and 
Tyranny Unmasked (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 1992 [originally published in 1822]). For an 
excellent introduction to John Taylor, see M.E. Bradford's essay, "A Virginia Cato: John Taylor of 
Caroline and the Agrarian Republic," in John Taylor, Arator (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 1977 
[originally published in 18181). 
l79William Jeffery, Jr. "The Letters of 'Brutus'-A Neglected Element in the Ratification Campaign 
of 1787-88," University of Cincinnati Law Review 40, no. 4 (1971): 643-777. "Brutus" argued that 
the federal legislature, being the sole judge of what is necessary for the common welfare, would 
eventually lead to a consolidated nation usurping the rightful sovereignty of the states. 
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as Russell Kirk points out, Randolph did not have the veneration for the Federal 
Republic and the Constitution that Calhoun had, Randolph was instrumental in 
sharpening Calhoun's perceptions of the dangers of consolidation, including the 
loss of state sovereignty. 
B.   THE NULLIFICATION CRISIS 
HP he next major political event in Calhoun's career, and the event that 
catapulted him into the staunch states-rights camp for the remainder of his 
career, was the Nullification Crisis of 1830 - 1833.180 The Nullification Crisis 
centered around the Tariffs of 1824, 1828, and 1832. The planters of South 
Carolina claimed that the tariffs on imports were financing the Northern 
manufacturing interests at the expense of the South.181 The economic depression 
in South Carolina, along with the tariffs, created an atmosphere of growing 
sectionalism. The citizens of South Carolina were starting to feel that if they were 
not adequately represented in the Congress, they might be better off outside the 
Union. As Vice President of the United States in 1824 and 1828, Calhoun 
watched as the Tariff bills were passed against the will of the southern agrarian 
interests. To the southerners, the South Carolinians in particular, the bill 
represented a continuing usurpation of their livelihood at the hands of the 
northern manufacturing interests.182 This animosity led to a growing secessionist 
movement, which gained popularity in Calhoun's state of South Carolina. 
Calhoun, not wanting disunion, advocated instead the use of "a veto on the part 
180For an excellent account of the Nullification controversy, see William W. Freehling, Prelude to 
Civil War: The Nullification Controversy in South Carolina 1816-1836 (New York: Harper & 
Row, Publishers, 1966). 
181Ibid.: 25^18. Freehling makes the case that the problem, although exacerbated by the tariffs, 
was also the result of a slump in cotton prices, a recession, and the fact that the majority of the 
planters were heavily in debt due to real estate over-expansion in an earlier boom cycle. 
182Irving Barteltt, Calhoun: A Biography (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1993): pp. 142- 
143. 
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of the local interests, or under our system on the part of the states."183 Calhoun's 
theory on the principle of nullification was then put to paper in the South Carolina 
Exposition and Protest.IU 
The idea of putting forth grievances against the overstepping of 
constitutional authority by the federal government was not original in Calhoun's 
work. This idea originated from the Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions of 1798, 
penned by James Madison and Thomas Jefferson respectively.185 The 
Resolutions were a protest against the national government.186 They argued that 
the Alien and Sedition Laws not only exceeded the legitimate authority of the 
government, but also, in the case of the Sedition Act, expressly violated the 
Constitution. The resolutions from the Hartford Convention of 1814 constitute 
183Ibid.: p. 144. 
184John C. Calhoun, "South Carolina Exposition and Protest," Union and Liberty (Indianapolis, 
IN: Liberty Fund, 1992): pp. 311-365. As Vice President of the United States, Calhoun allowed 
discretion to be the better part of valor and did not attach his name to the document, although it 
was widely speculated that he was indeed the author. See also Bartlett, Calhoun: A Biography: 
pp. 139-152; Pauline Maier, "The Road Not Taken: Nullification, John C. Calhoun, and the 
Revolutionary Tradition in South Carolina," South Carolina Historical Magazine 82 (January 
1981):1-19; and Lacy K. Ford Jr., "Inventing the Concurrent Majority: Madison, Calhoun and the 
Problem of Majoritarianism in American Political Thought," The Toumal of Southern History 55, 
no. 1 (Feb. 1994): 19-58. 
185Both Resolutions can be found in David B. Mattern, J. C A. Stagg, Susan Holbrook Perdue and 
Jeanne K. Cross, et al., eds., The Papers of Tames Madison, Volume XVII (Charlottesville, VA: 
University Press of Virginia, 1991). This work will be referred to from now on as Madison 
Papers. See also James Madison, "The Report of 1800", Madison Papers, where Madison ably 
defended both of the Resolutions and presented a formidable critique of the Alien and Sedition 
Laws. Lacy K. Ford Jr., in "Inventing the Concurrent Majority," adds that Madison, upon reading 
Calhoun's Exposition and Fort Hill Address, commented that he had never advocated in any of his 
earlier writings the concept of nullification. Jefferson, on the other hand, in a revised Kentucky 
Resolution of 1799, explicitly declared that a state had the right to nullify a law that had the 
potential to do evil against the state. See "The Kentucky Resolutions of 1799," Speeches and 
Documents in American History, Volume I, Robert Birley, ed. (London: Oxford University Press, 
1962): 249-251. 
186Throughout Calhoun's writings, as with many authors of that period, the term 'general 
government,' is synonymous with the term federal government. 
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another example of written grievances against the national government prior to 
the Nullification Crisis.187 
Although the tariff passed on 19 May 1828, Calhoun's Exposition was 
essentially the start of his theoretical work on the principles of states-rights, 
sovereignty and concurrent majority. Throughout this phase of Calhoun's 
career, he still remained a staunch supporter of the Union, for he knew that if the 
Union did come apart, it would inevitably lead to anarchy. In 1831, when the 
secessionist movement in South Carolina gained momentum, Calhoun wrote the 
Fort Hill Address 188 to direct his fellow citizens on a much more moderate path. 
In this address, as well as in his letter to South Carolina Governor James 
Hamilton,189 Calhoun solidified his position that it is the States that have the 
ultimate sovereignty over the decisions within their borders. From the 
beginning, with the ratification of the Constitution of the United States, it Was the 
States, which acted as independent sovereigns, that brought the Constitution into 
existence.190 Calhoun then argued that, since the States have the final arbitration 
over their welfare, the States have the right as co-equals with the General 
Government, to: 
187The Hartford Convention was the result of the Embargo Act during the War of 1812. The Act 
was a major economic setback for the New England merchants, and as a result, the war was 
extremely unpopular in that region. The resolutions stated that "it be and hereby is 
recommended to the legislature of the several States represented in this Convention, to adopt all 
such measures as may be necessary effectually to protect the citizens of said States from the operation of 
all Acts which have been or may be passed by the Congress of the United States, which shall 
contain provisions, subjecting the militia or other citizens to forcible drafts, conscriptions, or 
impressments, not authorized by the constitution of the United States." Speeches and Documents in 
American History: 282-287 (emphasis added). It is interesting to note that a great opponent of 
the War of 1812, one who recommended state interposition, was Daniel Webster, Calhoun's great 
opponent in the Senate during the Nullification Crisis. See Merrill Peterson, The Great 
Triumvirate: 43-44. 
188
'The Fort Hill Address: On the Relation of the States and Federal Government, July 26,1831", 
Union and Liberty: 367-400. 
189
"Letter to James Hamilton Jr., (Governor of S.C.) August 28,1832", Calhoun Papers: 613-649. 
190Ibid.: pp. 615-616. 
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judge of its powers, with a negative or veto on the acts of others, in order to 
protect against encroachments, the interests it particularly represents: a principle 
which all of our [state] constitutions recognize in the distribution of power 
among their respective departments, as essential to maintain the independence of 
each; but which, to all who will duly reflect on the subject, must appear far more 
essential, for the same object, in that great and fundamental distribution of powers 
between the states and General Government .191 
When confronting the possible dilemma of a state abusing the power of 
the veto, Calhoun declared that he did "not claim for a State the right to abrogate 
an act of the General Government. It is the Constitution, that annuls an 
unconstitutional act."192 Calhoun held that the States in the federal compact 
have a duty to abide by the provisions of that compact. If a State claims that a 
law is unconstitutional and thereby nullifies that law, the remaining States-if a 
three-fourths majority is found-can amend the constitution, thereby making that 
previously nullified law constitutional, thus taking away the grounds of 
unconstitutionality of the nullifying State.193 This, according to Calhoun, is the 
concurrent majority in operation. 
The political denouement for Calhoun during the Nullification Crisis came 
during the debates on the Force Bill. The Force Bill was introduced to counter 
South Carolina's Nullification Ordinance of 1833. The Ordinance stipulated that 
the tariffs of 1828 and 1832 were unconstitutional, null and void, that therefore 
the citizens of the State were not required to pay the customs on imports, and 
that they had the right to retrieve goods (in which duties were not paid) held by 
the U.S. Customs officer.194 The Force Bill countered the Ordinance by stating 
that duties must be paid prior to receipt of goods, and what is more important, 
reiterated that the President had the authority to use the Navy and the Army 
191
 "Fort Hill Address," Union and Liberty: p. 376. Emphasis added. 
192
 "Letter to James Hamilton Jr.," Calhoun Papers: p. 317. 
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against the citizens of South Carolina "without issuing a prior proclamation 
warning insurgents to disperse."195 
The introduction of the Force Bill on the floor of the Senate led Calhoun to 
introduce a set of resolutions pertaining to the relation of the National 
Government and the States,196 followed by a two-day speech.197 The resolutions, 
in declaration against the Force Bill, were as follows: 
1. That the people of the several States composing these United States are united 
as parties to a constitutional compact, to which the people of each State acceded 
as a separate sovereign community... 
2. ...and that whenever the General Government assumes the exercise of powers 
not delegated by the compact, its acts are unauthorized, and are of no effect; and 
that the same Government is not made the final judge of the powers delegated to 
it, since that would make its discretion, and not the Constitution, the measure of 
its powers; but that, as in all other cases of compact among sovereign parties, 
without any common judge, each has an equal right to judge for itself, as well of 
the infraction as of the mode and measures of redress. 
3. That the assertions... [that the United States was an unitary nation and not a 
federal republic composed of sovereign states] are not only without foundation 
in truth, but are contrary to the most certain and plain historical facts,... and that 
all exercise of power on the part of the General Government...claiming authority 
from so erroneous assumptions, must of necessity be unconstitutional, must tend 
directly and inevitably to subvert the sovereignty of the States, to destroy the 
federal character of the Union, and to rear on its ruins a consolidated 
Government, without constitutional check or limitation, and which must 
necessarily terminate in the loss of liberty itself.198 
The purpose of the resolutions was to make the debate on the Force Bill a matter 
of principle to be decided upon once and for all.199 For Calhoun, it was a chance 
to build his inverted pyramid of logic (that is, he started with one premise and 
then expanded his argument based upon that premise).  If the Senate would 
195
 Ibid.: 284-286 
196
"Speech Introducing Resolutions Declaratory of the Nature and Power of the Federal 
Government, January 22,1833" Calhoun Papers: 18-26. 
197John C Calhoun, "Speech on the Revenue Collection [Force] Bill," Union and Liberty: 401-460. 
198
"Speech Introducing Resolutions Declaratory of the Nature and Power of the Federal 
Government," Calhoun Papers, Volume XII: 25-26. 
1
 "Peterson, The Great Triumvirate: 222. Calhoun himself remarked that he introduced the 
resolutions "to test those principles, with a desire that they should be discussed and voted on 
before the [Force] bill came up for discussion." The majority ordered otherwise. 
-63- 
agree that the states had acceded to the Union as sovereign entities, his other 
arguments would fall into line and thus defend his position. 
When the resolutions were not brought to the floor for a vote, and the 
Force Bill was introduced instead, Calhoun rose on 15 February to commence his 
two-day speech against the Jackson Administration and to defend his position on 
states-rights. The crux of the issue was, "Has this government a right to impose 
burdens on the capital and industry of one portion of the country, not with a 
view to revenue, but to benefit another?" And, if the general government does 
impose unequal burdens that go against the Constitution, in what manner can 
the States protect their reserved powers assured under the Tenth Amendment? 
Calhoun reiterated the principles of Nullification expressed in the Exposition and 
Fort Hill Address. Calhoun stressed that the act of nullifying a law applies only to 
laws that are expressly against the Constitution. Calhoun conceded that it would be 
folly to allow States to nullify any particular law that they do not approve. But, 
the States, retaining the ultimate sovereignty over their welfare, need to maintain 
their sovereignty against the encroachments of the General Government. 
This ascendancy can only be preserved through the action of the States as 
organized bodies, having their own separate governments, and possessed of the 
right, under the structure of our system, of judging of the extent of their separate 
powers, and of interposing their authority to arrest the unauthorized enactments 
of the General Government within their respective limits.200 
Calhoun concluded his speech by asserting that if the South were to fail in its 
opposition, all Southerners would be forever excluded from the protections of 
the General Government, and the North would reign supreme in the Union. 
After Calhoun's speech, Senator Daniel Webster rose and gave his 
rebuttal, which was similar in style and content to his famous speech against 
200John C. Calhoun, "Speech on the Revenue Collection [Force] Bill," Union and Liberty: 455. 
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Senator Robert Hayne on 26 January 1830. Webster's purpose was to reject the 
compact theory and to reiterate the revolutionary aspect of nullification, equating 
it with secession and the death of the union. Webster argued that the law of the 
Union was the supreme law of the land, not allowed to be judged by the 
States.201 Webster maintained that the United States are one people, not people 
of various states that created the Union. Webster said that "Congress may judge 
of the true extent and just interpretation of the specific powers granted to it..."202 
Webster contended that the Constitution will not be overstepped by the General 
Government because the "Members of Congress are chosen by the people; like 
other public agents, they are bound by oath to support the constitution. These 
are the securities that they will not violate their duty, or transcend their 
powers."203 
On 26 February 1833, Calhoun's Resolutions on the Nature of the Federal 
Relations were under consideration, and he used this as an opportunity to rebut 
Webster's speech ten days prior.204 Calhoun's speech was an excellent display of 
the "forensic lashing" of which he was so capable. Calhoun used an earlier 
speech of Webster's (Webster's Reply to Hayne, 26 January 1830) against 
Webster. Calhoun noted that Webster had acknowledged that the Constitution 
was a compact, and that Webster's state of Massachusetts had used the same 
language in the ratification of the Constitution. 
Calhoun used this foothold in Webster's own speech to contend that "we 
the people" were the citizens of the sovereign States who ratified the 
201
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Constitution, not the aggregate of the Union.205   Calhoun asserted that the 
Constitution does not explicitly state that the Supreme Court is the ultimate 
arbitrator over the Constitution. It is the States, as parties to the compact, who 
are to be the ultimate judges, for are they not also part of the federal system? 
And since the Supreme Court is part of the General Government, and the Tenth 
Amendment protects the States from an encroachment by the General 
Government on their reserved powers, does it not follow that the Supreme Court 
does not have the proper authority to judge of encroachments against the States 
by the General Government?  Here, Calhoun fell back on his core belief that 
government should be the rule of law and not the rule of man. Calhoun believed 
that power begets power, and that eventually, some officials will disregard their 
oath of office for the aggrandizement of power. Therefore, if there is not in place 
a system whereby the states have a clear mode of redress against violations of 
their rights, then ultimately, the General Government will slowly encroach on the 
rights of the States, eventually reducing them to mere administrative units. 
Calhoun concluded that 
the very fact that the States may interpose will produce moderation and justice. 
The General Government will abstain from the exercise of any power in which 
they may suppose three fourths of the States will not sustain them; while, on the 
other hand, the States will not interpose but on the conviction that they will be 
supported by one fourth of their co-States. Moderation and justice will produce 
confidence, attachment, and patriotism; and these, in turn, will offer most 
powerful barriers against the excesses of conflicts between the States and the 
General Government206 
One of the main misperceptions that Webster, as well as many others, had 
of Calhoun's doctrine of nullification, was that a State government could nullify 
205por a recent discussion of the states-rights issue as it pertains to the ratification of the 
Constitution, see Forrest McDonald, Novus Ordo Seclorum:  The Intellectual Origins of the 
Constitution (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 1985): 147-157, and 279-284. 
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any law, thus abrogating that law for the entire Union.   Calhoun always 
emphasized that nullification was an instrument to be used only if the General 
Government passed a law that was clearly unconstitutional; and then, only after 
a special State convention on the subject stated-majority permitting--the same. 
Calhoun also repeated that if that law was made constitutional via the amending 
process, the nullifying state was duty bound, having ratified the original 
compact, to adhere to the amended constitution. Calhoun was always consistent 
in his argument that whatever is in the sphere of the National Government, 
under the Constitution, the National Government is allowed to perform to its 
fullest capacities.207 
Freehling makes several criticisms of Calhoun's logic that deserve 
comment; for they are the remarks usually expressed by Calhoun's detractors.208 
Freehling asserts that Calhoun would have destroyed the amending process as 
expressed in the Constitution because a single State could nullify a law. 
Calhoun, in his Discourse, and in several of his speeches, expressly declared that 
if the normal constitutional amending processes were followed, and the States 
amended the Constitution so as to make the offensive law constitutional, then the 
nullifier would have no choice but to acquiesce, "by the solemn obligation which 
it contracted, in ratifying the constitution."209 In fact, Calhoun stated that: 
it is the duty of the federal government to invoke its aid (the amending process), 
should any dangerous derangement or disorder result from the mutual negative 
of the two co-ordinate governments, or from the interposition of a State, in its 
207For example, see Calhoun's defense of Congress' authority over the circulation of money, as 
described in Bray Hammond, Banks and Politics in America: From the Revolution to the Civil 
War (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957): 234-236,367-368, and 427-429. 
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sovereign character, to arrest one of its acts-in case all other remedies should fail 
to adjust the difficulty.210 
In short Calhoun never argued that a single state had the power to alter the 
Constitution. 
Freehling's second criticism asserts that the right of three-quarters of the 
states to amend the Constitution forced the States to relinquish part of their 
sovereignty; for the dissenting States in the amendment process must obey the 
constitutional amendment, as parties to the compact. Calhoun would answer 
that the Union had already tried to make legislation via unanimous consent in 
the Articles of Confederation, and as a result, the Union came close to anarchy 
before the Founding Fathers intervened with the creation of the Constitution. 
Therefore, in order to prevent a recurrence of the same situation, the sovereign 
States delegated their authority in the Constitution, of certain enumerated powers, 
to be used by the National Government.211 
The last criticism on Calhoun's logic, Freehling states, is that Calhoun 
destroys the Lockean social-contract theory. This destruction is caused when 
Calhoun gives to the portion of the community (defined as the States) the power 
to judge and annul laws that the governed had consented to in the original 
compact (defined as the Constitution), thus returning society to a state of 
anarchy. Calhoun's rebuttal would state that the inherent right of self-defense in 
a sovereign state would allow that state to abrogate laws that are expressly 
contrary to the original contract that the parties assented to in the first place. The 
decision of the government to create laws contrary to the original compact and to 
the well-being of the state was, for Calhoun, a state of anarchy in itself. 
210Ibid.: 208-209. 
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Although the South Carolinians did not follow the letter of their 
Nullification Ordinance, the effect they desired was, for the most part, achieved. 
The legality of their actions is still being debated today. Yet the actions of 
Calhoun in the Nullification Crisis were quite similar to those of the abolitionists 
a decade later in the passage of Personal-Liberty Laws that were in conflict with 
to the Federal Fugitive Slave Laws. 
Although the Nullification Crisis is the most recognizable incident of the 
use of nullification or interposition in American politics, there were other notable 
incidents in which a State or States objected to the execution of a federal law. As 
stated above, one prominent example was the Northern use of personal-liberty 
laws, which in effect annulled the Federal Fugitive Slave Laws. The personal- 
liberty laws came about as a result of Prigg v. Pennsylvania (1842), a case in which 
the U.S. Supreme Court decided that the States did not have the "right to 
legislate on the subject of fugitive slaves at all."212 
One of the first challenges, in which a state effectively nullified the 
Supreme Court ruling, was the Latimer case of 1842.213 This case illustrated that 
the state of Massachusetts did not cooperate with the federal authorities in the 
capture and return of a fugitive slave. "In effect, in this first duel, the Fugitive 
Law had been publicly flouted."214 To the Northerners, and the abolitionists in 
particular, the Constitution guaranteed to all the promise to "promote the 
general Welfare, and secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and our 
Posterity..." Therefore, according to the logic of the abolitionists, since the 
Fugitive Slave Laws went against the intent of the Constitution, the State had a 
212Louis B. Heller, The Crusade Against Slavery (New York:  Harper & Brothers, Publishers, 
1960):  170.  Heller adds that the Southerners as well as the Northerners saw this ruling as a 




right to ensure that the National Government did not attempt to impose an 
unconstitutional law upon its citizens. And, according to the logic put forth by 
Calhoun, since the States or National Government did not attempt to amend the 
Constitution to explicitly state otherwise, the Fugitive Laws were indeed 
unconstitutional.215 
For Calhoun, nullification was the tool with which States could protect 
themselves from the encroachments of the National Government. But Calhoun 
wanted to create a theoretical system of government that ensured an adequate 
protection, and a reliable mode of representation, for all parties involved. The 
system that Calhoun was building up to was the theory of concurrent majority. 
C  DISQUISITION ON GOVERNMENT AND THE THEORY OF 
CONCURRENT MAJORITY 
T ohn Calhoun's theory of concurrent majority was first formally outlined in his 
Disquisition on Government.216 The concurrent majority, as opposed to an 
absolute majority, presupposes the sovereignty of the state in a federative 
compact. The concurrent majority "considers the community as made up of 
different and conflicting interests, as far as the action of the government is 
concerned; and takes the sense of each, through its majority or appropriate 
organ, and the united sense of all, as the sense of the entire community."217 
Calhoun gives several historical examples of political units with an operating 
concurrent majority; these examples are the Republic of Poland-Lithuania (1569- 
1795), the Roman Republic (250-50 B.C.), the Iroquois Confederacy of Six Nations 
215Calhoun, it could be hypothesized, would be against this application of his logic, even though 
it conforms to his reasoning on the principle of Nullification. 
216John C. Calhoun, "Disquisition on Government" in Ross M. Lence, ed., Union and Liberty: 
The Political Philosophy of lohn C. Calhoun (Indianapolis, DM: Liberty Fund, 1992): 3-78. 
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(circa 1500-1787), and the English Constitution (circa 1688).   In each of the 
examples, Calhoun stresses, there existed, for all interests, a guaranteed right of 
self-protection with a "negative power--the power of preventing or arresting the 
action of government-be it called by what it may-veto, interposition, check, or 
balance of power-which, in fact, forms the constitution."218 It is this protection 
of states entering into a compact, Calhoun argues, that allows them to operate 
effectively. For without the adequate protection of the sovereignty of states, the 
absolute majority of the whole would lead to an absolute government, without 
any regard for the rights of States in a minority.219 
Calhoun states that the first step in the making of the concurrent majority 
is to create a constitution. For, as Calhoun stresses, since man is a social creature, 
he will always come together with his fellow man in social compacts and form 
governments.   But it is the advanced civilization that has the maturity and 
virtuousness necessary to form a constitution delineating clear roles for the 
government.220 One of the first steps in the constitutional process is the right of 
suffrage (for Calhoun, it is the "foundation of a constitutional government").221 
Though the right of suffrage is the keystone, it is also a potential millstone to be 
tied around the neck of the people. The reason is what Calhoun calls the dangers 
of the absolute majority. According to Calhoun, 
a struggle will take place between the various interests to obtain a majority, in 
order to control the government. If no one interest be strong enough, of itself, to 
obtain it, a combination will be formed between those whose interests are most 
alike...until  a sufficient number is obtained to make a majority....When once 
2l8Ibid.:28. 
219lbid.: 29. 
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formed, the community will be divided into two great parties~a major and 
minor- between which there will be incessant struggles...222 
The faithful supporters of the dominant party will benefit from a vast system of 
patronage. Then, Calhoun states, politicians will show loyalty, not to the country 
and Constitution that they were sworn to uphold and protect, but to the party 
which brought them into office.223 This would continue until the party in power, 
by using the principle of absolute majority, would pass enough laws to solidify 
its position.of power until there would be left only two alternatives: despotism or 
revolution.224 
How then, Calhoun asks, can the minority be protected from the potential 
abuses of the majority? It is "by taking the sense of each interest or portion of the 
community, which may be unequally and injuriously affected by the action of the 
government, separately, through its own majority, or in some other way by 
which its voice may be fairly expressed; and to the consent of each interest, either 
to put or to keep the government in action."225 The "interest or portion" that 
Calhoun is alluding to consists of the separate states.226 
As stated before, Calhoun, in his Disquisition on Government, gives four 
examples of the concurrent majority in operation: the First Polish Republic, the 
222Ibid.: 15-16. 
223Ibid.: 33. Calhoun adds that "principles and policy would lose all influence in the elections; 
and cunning, falsehood, deception, slander, fraud and gross appeals to the appetites of the lowest 
and most worthless portions of the community, would take the place of sound reason and wise 
debate." 
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Confederacy of Six Nations, the Roman Republic, and the English Constitution. 
The records of each of these governments deserve to be summarized as Calhoun 
described them, and then to be analyzed from independent sources. 
Poland, according to Calhoun, furnishes the most extreme instance of a 
concurrent majority.227 The government required the acquiescence of every 
noble present, which numbered from 150,000 to 200,000, to elect the king. The 
Diet consisted of "the king, the senate, bishops and deputies of nobility...of the 
palatinates" in which all "possessed a veto necessary to enact a law or to adopt 
any measure whatever." This in effect made every nobleman a majority interest 
in the government. Calhoun contends that the amazing aspect of the Polish 
government was its ability to defeat the Moslems when they twice invaded 
Europe. The downfall was not due to Poland's military vulnerability to external 
threats, but due to the intrigues of her neighbors, which caused her to crumble 
from within.228 
The Confederacy of Six Nations is Calhoun's next example. The 
Confederacy had six separate nations with seven delegates from each nation in 
the council. Each member of the council had a veto on all decisions, similar to 
the Polish system. Calhoun states that the Confederacy, under this system of 
government, became the most powerful of the Indian tribes in the borders of the 
United States.229 
The Roman Republic had its birth when the plebeians (the lower class) 
threw off the yoke of oppression and essentially forced the patricians (the nobles) 
to accept the election, by the plebeians, of two tribunes (increased later to ten), to 
227




protect their interests.230 This action by the plebeians enabled them to secure a 
veto on the actions of the patricians in the Senate. This republican form of 
government continued for centuries, states Calhoun, because the two classes, 
with their mutual vigilance to prevent potential abuses, were able to harmonize 
their interests. The Roman Republic's downfall came when the patricians used 
the acquired wealth of plunder to "corrupt and debase" the plebeians, a situation 
that the constitution was not capable of dealing with.231 
The constitution of Great Britain was the result of a process commencing 
with the Norman Conquest of 1066. After "many vicissitudes" and a long 
struggle, the "feudal monarchy was converted...into a highly refined 
constitutional monarchy, without changing the basis of the original 
government."232 This constitutional monarchy is divided into three main 
branches or "estates": the king, the House of Lords and the House of Commons. 
Laws are enacted with the concurrence of both chambers of Parliament and the 
approval of the king. The main tension in the realm is between the House of 
Commons and the monarchy, with the House of Lords acting as the buffer.233 
The reason the Lords are the buffer, states Calhoun, is that the Lords are the 
recipients of the "honors and emoluments" from the crown, and ascendancy of 
either the House of Commons or the Crown would be a detriment to the power 
of the House of Lords. Thus, the House of Lords is "opposed to the ascendancy 
of either--and in favor of preserving the equilibrium between them."234 
These four examples of the concurrent majority are quite distinct. The 







libertarian democracy (although the suffrage was only extended to the 
aristocracy). The Confederacy of Six Nations illustrated a representative federal 
republic; the Roman Republic exemplified the concurrent majority quelling 
intense class differences that threatened to rip asunder the entire government; 
and the English constitutional monarchy, while similar to the Roman example in 
the class differences, operated with a bicameral legislative method which could 
only enact laws with the concurrence of all three branches. The validity of 
Calhoun's examples must be assessed. 
1. Analysis of Calhoun's Examples 
a. The First Polish Republic 
The first example, and indeed the most extreme, of the concurrent 
majority governments is the First Polish Republic, or the Republic of Poland- 
Lithuania in 1569-1795. Although Calhoun does not explicitly state that this was 
a concurrent majority government, he does mention the use of the liberum veto,' 
which was only used in the Republic of Poland-Lithuania. The main reason that 
this, out of all the examples that Calhoun gives, is the most extreme, is that the 
concurrent majority was, in reality, a concurrent unanimity. This principle was 
not only used in the main legislative body, the Sejm, but also in the electoral 
process for choosing a new king. Although the right of suffrage only extended to 
land-holding nobles, this still led to a situation where tens of thousands of nobles 
assembled in a field to choose, by unanimous consent, a king. Needless to say, 
the situation was chaotic at best.235 After election, the king had to accede to the 
conditions "on which they [the nobles] would agree to his coronation."236 One of 
235Norman Davies, God's Playground: A History of Poland. Volume I. The Origins to 1795 (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 1982): 332-334. Davies makes the point by stating that in 1764, 
when "only thirteen electors were killed, it was said the Election was unusually quiet." 
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the most radical rights of the nobles was the "right of resistance, indeed their 
duty to disobey the king if he contravened his oath."237  Even though the king 
seemed to be a hostage of the nobles, he exercised considerable latitude over the 
proceedings of the Sejm. 
In the Sejm, as well as in the dietines (the assemblies in each of the 
separate provinces of the kingdom), the principle of unanimity also held. 
No proposal could become law, and no decision was binding, unless it received 
the full assent of all those persons who were competent to consider it. A single 
voice of dissent was equivalent to total rejection. Majority voting was 
consciously rejected. There was to be unanimity or nothing;...238 
The reason for this type of voting procedure seems to have been 
twofold. First, law enforcement in the Republic was non-existent and left up to 
the individual.239 Therefore, in order for the nobles to obey the law, they would 
all have to consent to it in the first place. Secondly, the nobles in the Sejm felt 
that the threat of complete chaos if the legislative agenda was not agreed to was 
impetus enough to force compromises on the issues. In the Sejm, the method of 
dissent was known as the 'liberum veto/ in which a single noble could voice 
dissent on an issue and completely stop the entire proceedings until the cause of 
dissent was rectified by the dissenter and the Marshal of the Sejm.240 It might 
seem to an outside observer that gridlock would be a perpetual occurrence, yet 
this procedure operated without great difficulty until 1652, when a liberum veto' 
was used; but the dissenter then left and could not be found. The Marshall of the 
Sejm, holding to strict constitutionality, declared the veto valid, and thus all 
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realized the potential for disruption they could cause, bribery became rampant in 
the Sejm in order to stall the government. This was insidious for Poland, for no 
decision concerning the state could occur without the full consent of the entire 
Sejm. 
b. The Confederacy of Six Nations 
Calhoun's next example of the working concurrent majority was 
the Confederacy of Six Nations. The Confederacy was first founded around 1500 
using an unwritten constitution (similar to that of the British).242 Although the 
Iroquois philosophy of private property was radically different from 
Calhoun's,243 their decision-making process was almost a mirror-image of the 
system of concurrent majority. In the legislative process, consensus had to be 
reached between the Cayugas and the Oneidas, followed then by the Senecas and 
Mohawks,244 The next stage in the policy-making process went to the 
Onondagas, who acted as a judicial reviewing body to decide the 
constitutionality of the legislation. If the legislation was deemed to be injurious 
to the peoples of the Confederacy, and inconsistent with the Great Law of Peace, 
the legislation process began again, in order to amend the offending piece of 
legislation.245 Once the Onondagas reached consensus on constitutionality, the 
legislation was taken to the chief presiding over the debates, who confirmed it by 
242Wayne Moquin, "Constitution of the Iroquois Federation, Degandawida (Mohawk)," Great 
Documents in American Indian History (New York: Preager, 1973): 20. The Confederacy was 
originally comprised of the Mohawk, Oneida, Onondaga, Cayuga and the Seneca; with the 
Tuscarora joining later. 
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way of unanimous consent, whereupon the legislation was announced to all the 
tribes.246 
If the peoples of the different tribes thought the constitution needed 
revising, or the laws needed to be changed, they could, according to the Great 
Law of Peace, "propose their own laws even when the leaders fail to do so." The 
system of checks and balances set up by the Confederation was "strictly adhered 
to."247 For example: 
the hereditary peace chiefs were interested only in external matters like war, 
peace, and treaty-making; the Grand Council could not interfere with the internal 
affairs of the tribe; and each tribe had its own sachems (chiefs), although they 
were limited in that they could only deal with their tribe's relations with other 
tribes, and had no say in matters that were traditionally the concern of the 
clan.24** 
c. The Roman Republic 
The Roman Republic, Calhoun's third example, was divided into 
two main parts, the Assembly and the Senate. The Assembly, according to 
historians, was the only body that "could pass laws; they alone elected annual 
magistrates; in the earlier part of the period, they even heard major trials and 
made policy decisions about Rome's relations with foreign powers."249 In theory 
and in fact (at least in the early part of the Republic), the Senate was granted the 
power to write laws, but the Assembly was the only body that could enact the 
laws. This made the Republic resemble Calhoun's concurrent majority in that 
there were interests (the Senate and the Assembly) that had a check on each 
other. The Assembly members could not create laws on their own recognizance, 
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legislate laws in their favor. And if the Senators had the power to pass laws they 
introduced, likewise, they would have done so to consolidate their power within 
the system. 
In the Assemblies, the voting was not done according to individual 
head count, but by a count of fixed groups within the Assembly itself.250 This, it 
seems, reflects the essence of Calhoun's concurrent majority in that consensus 
was reached by taking a sense of the different groups within the system. The 
Roman Republic operated efficiently in this manner from approximately 250 BC 
to 100 BC. The system of checks and balances in the Senate and Assembly 
apparently began to erode in the first century BC when it became commonplace 
for the Roman nobles to bribe the assemblies to get the necessary votes to pass 
legislation. The nobles, in fact, "more than any other social elite in history, were 
dependent on popular elections for the very definition of their relative status in 
society, [and] were willing to pay a high price for the vote of the urban plebs."251 
The nobles, in effect, had to bribe the assemblies in order to get re-elected back 
into office. Once this behavior became prevalent, the assemblies lost their 
effective check on the nobles, and the Republic began its rapid decline into 
Empire. 
A. The English Constitution in the Classical Age 
"Nowhere in the [English] constitution did there exist an arbitrary 
power, capable of imposing its commands on the subjects, carrying them out by 
250Ibid.: 5. North states that the Assemblies were voting meetings. The Romans had different 
assemblies for different purposes, probably similar to the committee structure in the U.S. 
Congress. The system of group-voting led to a hierarchy in the assemblage in which the 
dominant families, in wealth and prestige, came to exercise a great amount of control over the 
voting blocks. It seems that the voting groups were, in the modern sense, interest groups. 
251
 Alexander Yakobson, "Petitio Et Largitio: Popular Participation in the Centuriate Assembly of 
the Late Republic," Tournal of Roman Studies 82, (Annual 1992): 50. Yakobson states that many 
of the Roman nobles in the Senate and the Magistrate had, in the course of their political careers, 
incurred enormous debts in order to stay in office. 
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its own executive action, subjecting their meaning and effect to its own 
jurisdiction."252 This was the system of the British government before the 
independence of the Colonies that became the United States, and the system 
Calhoun refers to. The Parliament did indeed have the legislative supremacy, 
but the power of the executive and the administration of law lay with the Crown 
and his (or her) Cabinet. The judicial system was a "duality between Chancery 
and Common Law courts," yet, the Judges, through the Act of Settlement, were 
independent of both branches.253 
Although the supremacy of Parliament was much greater than that 
of the United States Congress, the Parliament did indeed operate under the 
system of checks and balances between the Monarch, the House of Lords, and the 
House of Commons.254 The King's system of patronage was considered an 
effective means of checking any encroachments by the Parliament, for it was the 
members of Parliament who were the beneficiaries of the "emoluments." This 
system worked well when the internal affairs of the nation were running without 
difficulty. Once a political problem arose which caused dissent and distrust, the 
system began to break down.255 It is interesting to note in view of Calhoun's 
concern in this regard, that minority representation was lacking in the British 
example; the absence of such representation prevented the thirteen colonies from 
obtaining proper redress in Parliament, thus leading to the War of Independence. 
Calhoun's description of the four examples matches closely with 
historical analyses performed 150 years later. Of these four, the Confederacy of 
252Sir David Lindsay Keir, The Constitutional History of Modern Britain: Since 1485 (London: 
Adams and Charles Black, 1961): 294. This period, 1714-1782, is referred to as the "Classical Age 
of the Constitution." 
253Ibid.   Sir David does point out that the judges could be removed from office with the 




Six Nations seems to offer the best overall example of the concurrent majority. It 
alone contains all of the principles of concurrent majority that Calhoun lays out 
in his Disquisition. For example, all of the tribal nations had an effective check on 
each other in the Great Council, there was a judicial review that strictly adhered 
to the constitution, and there was a clearly delineated separation of powers, not 
only in the central government (the Great Council) but in the individual nations 
as well. 
D. CALHOUN'S ANALYSIS OF THE JUDICIARY 
/^alhoun's A Discourse on the Constitution and Government of the United States 
was the sequel to the Disquisition. In the Discourse, Calhoun uses the theory 
of concurrent majority to explain the governmental process of the United States. 
Calhoun's admiration of the Constitution is apparent, especially in the area of the 
Judiciary. Calhoun contends that the check that the Judiciary possesses on the 
rest of the government, along with its complete independence of the other two 
branches (given unimpeachable behavior), gives a "weight and dignity to the 
judicial department never before possessed by the judges in any other 
government of which we have any certain knowledge."256 The contention that 
Calhoun introduces is that the National Government, as with any political body, 
will always attempt to aggrandize its power at the expense of others. Since the 
three departments-the Executive, the Legislative and the Judiciary-have 
sufficient checks on each other, Calhoun is not that concerned about a potential 
take-over of the National Government by one of its concomitant branches. But, 
the States, which only have the Tenth Amendment as a shield, are more 
vulnerable. The Supremacy Clause of the Constitution,257 Calhoun contends, is 
256John C. Calhoun, "A Discourse on the Constitution and Government of the United States," 
Liberty and Union: 157. 
257U.S. Constitution: Article III, Section 2. 
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the clause that the National Government uses to construct the limits of its own 
authority; it then uses that authority to usurp the proper authority of the 
States.258 
Calhoun's rebuttal to the National Government's Supremacy Clause 
argument is two-fold. First, there is nothing in the Constitution which expressly 
declares the Supreme Court's right to enforce its decisions over the laws of the 
several States.259 Also, there does not exist in the Constitution any passage that 
provides that either the U.S. Supreme Court or State Supreme Courts can be 
made defendants against each other. If there does not exist any such language, 
Calhoun argues, then the Constitution must be construed by the National 
Government, so as to allow it the authority to assume the supremacy. This 
interpretation allows the Supreme Court to claim ultimate jurisdiction over the 
Constitution. But, Calhoun argues, this ultimate arbitration belongs to the 
character of a national government, not a federal government.260 
In a true federal government, Calhoun maintains, the right of deciding the 
constitutionality of a law belongs to both of the "co-ordinate" governments: the 
State and National Governments. Therefore, "where two governments differ as 
to the extent of their respective powers, a mutual negative is in the 
consequence."261 Although Calhoun agrees that such a system would lead to 
conflict between the two spheres, he maintains that the potential evil of absolute 
government, a government that can exercise despotic control over the States, is 
by far the greater evil to contend with. Calhoun also reasons that the accusation 
258John C. Calhoun, "A Discourse on the Constitution and Government of the United States," 





that State Courts always lean in favor of the State is another weak defense of the 
implied supremacy of the Supreme Court: 
But if the State courts should have a strong leaning in favor of the powers of their 
respective States, what reason can be assigned, why the Supreme Court of the 
United States should not have a leaning, equally strong, in favor of the federal 
go vernment?2°2 
For Calhoun, the remedy for a collision between the two spheres involves 
the amending process. For example, suppose a State Supreme Court declared 
unconstitutional the right of the National Government to pass legislation 
requiring the confiscation of all private property. The National Government then 
has several options; it can repeal the law or enforce the law. To enforce the law, 
the National Government must make the law appear constitutional; to do this, 
the federal courts, or even the Supreme Court, may rule that the law is in fact 
constitutional, and require the State to comply with the federal law. 
The State then has two courses. The State can either acquiesce, or, via a 
State convention on the subject, nullify the offending law. If the National 
Government still deems the law to be constitutional, then with a two-thirds 
majority in both chambers of Congress, it can request a constitutional 
amendment stating that ownership of private property is illegal; it can seek then 
the concurrence of three-quarters of the States. If three-quarters of the States 
agree with the National Government, then the proposed amendment becomes 
part of the Constitution, binding on all the States. The objecting State that sought 
nullification of the law then has no other recourse but to submit. But, if enough 
262Ibid.: 230. Calhoun asks a series of penetrating as to why the Supreme Court is supposedly 
such a sagacious institution, and the State Supreme Courts are not given the same accordance. 
-83- 
other States agree with the original State, preventing approval of a constitutional 
amendment, then the National Government must repeal the law.263 
E. CONCLUSION 
lohn C. Calhoun's theory of concurrent majority remains one of the most 
original and cogent theories of minority representation in a democratic 
government. The theory does not pretend to allow for an efficient government 
that is immediately responsive to all public needs.264 Instead, Calhoun viewed 
government as a protector of life, liberty, and property. Calhoun was a spiritual 
heir to the Old Republicans in supporting the axiom that only power can 
effectively check power. If one starts to rely on the restraint and virtue of others 
for safety, one may quickly find oneself in peril. 
From Patrick Henry and "Brutus,"265 to John Taylor266 and John 
Randolph, Calhoun argued within the context of a rich tradition of states-rights 
advocacy.   That his theory was attached to the defense of one of the most 
263Another excellent commentary on the Supreme Court from the same period can be found in 
John Taylor, Tyranny Unmasked: 193-268. Taylor states, concerning Judicial review and original 
intent: "It is found in no writer; it has never been a component part of any government; and it is 
highly probable when the constitution was made, that not a single person in the United States 
contemplated the idea, of its having empowered the Federal Supreme Court to divide political 
powers between the Federal and State governments, just as it does money between plaintiff and 
defendant." (p. 203) 
264Russell Kirk stated: "He slides quickly over formidable objections, he evades any very precise 
description of how the principle may be applied." Yet in spite of these flaws, Kirk added, 
Calhoun described "a philosophical principle, and it is one of the most sagacious and vigorous 
suggestions ever advanced by American conservatism." The Conservative Mind: 181. 
26?%üS government is to possess absolute and uncontroulable [sic] power, legislative, executive 
and judicial, with respect to every object to which it extends...It appears from these articles that 
there is no need of any intervention of the state governments, between the Congress and the 
people, to execute any one power vested in the general government, and that the constitution and 
laws of every state are nullified and declared void, so far as they are or shall be inconsistent with 
this constitution..." "The Letters of Brutus:" 667-668. 
266
 "Good theories for the preservation of liberty are most liable to be destroyed by piecemeal; 
bad ones, by a single blow: and therefore as ours is exposed to most danger from the detail mode 
of destruction, it is more important to the States to possess the right of self-preservation against 
the insidious enemy, than against one which dares not even show his face." John Taylor, 
Tyranny Unmasked: 204-205. 
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pernicious and abominable of all practices (slavery) led many of his peers in the 
North, as well as historians and Americans of all walks of life, to reject Calhoun's 
theory outright. The tendency to place the victors in the right and the 
vanquished in the wrong has prevented many from undertaking a serious 
consideration of the theoretical basis of what Calhoun defended in the arena of 
states-rights and state sovereignty. Calhoun's theories on representative 
government are not by any means the cure-all for political ailments. It is 
doubtful if there will ever be such a thing as a perfect model of government; the 
very nature of human behavior dictates otherwise. But John C. Calhoun's theory 
of concurrent majority merits a closer examination by those who wish to 
preserve, to some extent at least, the sovereignty of states pursuing a form of 
political integration. 
A.V. Dicey, in Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution, points 
out that the goal of a federal body is to "reconcile national unity and power with 
the maintenance of 'state rights'."267 Calhoun was a fervent believer in the 
Federal Republic. Yet he had the same opinion of man and government that 
many of the Founding Fathers possessed: to quote Lord Acton's famous maxim, 
"Power tends to corrupt, and absolute power corrupts absolutely." Calhoun held 
no illusion that the oath of office was a sufficient barrier to prevent the 
usurpation of power. In this regard, Calhoun stood in the same tradition as 
Federalists John Adams and Fisher Ames, as well as the anti-Federalist Patrick 
Henry. Calhoun recognized the inherent danger in the "tyranny of the majority" 
well before Alexis de Tocqueville's Democracy in America reached American 
shores. 
267A.V. Dicey Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution, (Indianapolis: Liberty 
Fund, 1982). The first edition was published in 1885. As a writer in the Lockean tradition, Dicey 
refers to the constitution as a contract or compact 
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Throughout the Disquisition, the Discourse, the speeches and the letters, 
Calhoun maintained that the only effective means to check power was through 
another agent of power. This did not mean the total hegemony of States over the 
National Government. Calhoun realized that such an arrangement would lead to 
the same crisis that befell the Republic with the Articles of Confederation. But 
also, Calhoun believed that the Supreme Court as the ultimate judge over the 
constitutionality of the legislature's actions and the ultimate arbitrator of the 
Constitution was not enough. In the last decade of his life, Calhoun witnessed an 
ever-growing predominance of the North over the South. To Calhoun, this 
meant that the Congress would be able to pass any legislation favoring the 
northern interests with impunity. Calhoun also realized that since the Senate 
approved Supreme Court Justices, and a Northern majority would always be 
able to choose the President, who would nominate the Justices, the Supreme 
Court would eventually be filled with jurists from the North, favoring the 
Northern perspective. 
With such a future scenario in mind, Calhoun became increasingly 
pessimistic regarding a National Government staying within its bounds. Since 
sovereignty was, for Calhoun, indivisible,268 he maintained that the States had 
the final judgment over its fate. The Supreme Court did have a proper and 
essential role in the checks and balances, but within the National Government 
Recent scholarship on the subject seems to confirm that Calhoun's foreboding 
about creeping centralization was well founded.269 Calhoun believed that the 
268Calhoun's predecessor, John Randolph of Roanoke, stated that "asking one of the states to 
surrender part of its sovereignty is like to asking a lady to surrender part of her chastity." See 
Russell Kirk, Tohn Randolph of Roanoke: 88-89. 
269George A. Bermann, 'Taking Subsidiarity Seriously: Federalism in the European Community 
and the United States," Columbia Law Review 94, no. 2 (March 1994): 447; "A strong body of 
opinion would continue to deny the Tenth Amendment judicial sanction altogether, on the theory 
that, by its composition and its procedures, Congress naturally protects the states anyway, and 
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states should not have to rely on the benevolence of the National Government to 
secure their liberty. On the other hand, a constitutional scholar, Raoul Berger, 
posits that the States indeed have, through their own Supreme Courts, had a real 
right to abrogate federal laws not made in pursuance of the Constitution.270 
To return to the original question at hand: does Calhoun's theory of the 
concurrent majority, and its concomitant tool, nullification, have any relevance to 
today's political circumstances in Europe? The framework laid out by Calhoun 
in his Disquisition on Government, as well as in his political actions and statements 
in the "Patrick Henry/Onslow Debates" and the Nullification Crisis match fairly 
well with certain aspects of the European Union in its past and present. The 
unanimity historically required for all the most important decision making in the 
European Coal and Steel Community, the European Economic Community and 
the European Community concur with Calhoun's premise. Seeing the nation- 
state as the final decision-maker also agrees with Calhoun's theory in that the 
member of that compact is the repository of sovereignty. The negotiations 
regarding the Single European Act and the Maastricht Treaty are consistent with 
Calhoun's logic of interests (the individual members of the EU) having a check 
on each other. 
The nation-state is still the most important actor in the integrative process 
of the EU.  Indeed, national identity in certain EU members (e.g., France and 
that if it does not, the states have only themselves to blame." Bermann also states that "neither 
the text of the Constitution nor the [Supreme] Court's federalism jurisprudence offers very strong 
legal guarantees that a proper political balance between the federal government and the states 
will be maintained...The Supreme Court's decision in Garcia -namely, that the legislative process 
itself may and must be relied upon to safeguard the basic autonomy of the states—remains 
essentially intact." (p. 423). 
270Raoul Berger, Congress v. The Supreme Court (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1969): 
258. Berger adds that the right of the States to judge unconstitutional an act of Congress comes 
from the Founders' reliance "on the inherent State court jurisdiction and the Article HI appellate 
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court" (p. 278). 
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Britain) will for the foreseeable future remain an important factor in national 
decision-making processes. Members with strong national identities will strive 
to the utmost to ensure that they maintain an effective check (especially in the 
Council of Ministers) on the encroachment of their sovereignty by the European 
Commission and the European Parliament. 
What needs to be accomplished now is to formalize the protection of the 
members in an EU constitution. This would accomplish two things. First, a 
written constitution would remove any ambiguity as to the proper roles of each 
organ within the EU framework (the member-states, the Commission, the 
European Parliament, the European Court of Justice, and the Council of 
Ministers). Secondly, it would give the smaller members an equal protection that 
the larger members currently enjoy due to their size and economic and political 
influence. As the two prior chapters have demonstrated, the non-accountability 
of the central government in regard to its members will always enable the central 
government to abuse its authority if it chooses to do so. A constitution based on 
concurrent majority principles might be able to hold the central government in 
check and to prevent any one member from holding hostage the decision-making 
process of the EU. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
Indeed, a constitutional provision giving to the great and separate interests of the community the right of 
self-protection, must appear, to those who will duly reflect on the subject, not less essential to the 
preservation of liberty than the right of suffrage itself...that those who make and execute the laws should be 
accountable to those on whom the laws in reality operate-the only solid and durable foundation of 
liberty.271 (John C. Calhoun) 
A. KEY FINDINGS 
I his thesis concludes that no theoretical construct is without anomalies and 
shortcomings. No theory can fully capture the complex realities- including 
the inherent unpredictableness of political choices-that will shape the unfolding 
events. The thesis may, however, succeed in identifying some broad trends and 
probabilities, in specifying the inadequacies of certain theoretical approaches, 
and in suggesting possible qualifications to some of the leading theories about 
political integration. The standard of evaluation used in this analysis is whether 
the theoretical approach is likely to protect effectively the sovereignty of the 
member states, and hence to win enduring popular support for the EU. 
Thus far, this thesis has demonstrated that the first three theories of 
integration-functionalism, neofunctionalism and federalism-do not provide an 
adequate model of the EU as it now exists, nor do they furnish a firm basis for 
ensuring the future cohesiveness of the EU. On the other hand, the theory of 
concurrent majority reflects some key features of the EU, and offers a foundation 
for assessing the future cohesiveness of the political structure. The thesis 
recommends that a clearly written constitution be drawn up at the 1996 EU 
Intergovernmental Conference to be ratified by the citizens of the member states, 
if they wish to ensure protection for national sovereignty. 
271
 John C. Calhoun, "The Fort Hill Address/' Union and Liberty: 372. 
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1. Functionalism and Neofunctionalism 
The thesis finds the theories of functionalism and neofunctionalism to be 
lacking for several reasons: the inaccuracy of the theories as a model of the EU, 
and the unsatisfactory consequences of the two theories in the context of 
democratic traditions. 
a. Inaccuracy of the Model 
Functionalism predicts that the community-level organization 
providing social welfare for the citizen will erode the sovereignty of the nation- 
state. The theory also predicts that for every functional problem that arises, a 
functional organization will come into existence to solve that problem and then 
fade away when the problem is solved. The examples that Mitrany uses are not, 
however, substantiated by independent analysis. The same problem is evident 
with the theory of neofunctionalism. 
b. Logical Consequences of Functionalism and Neofunctionalism 
A major problem with the above two theories is their reliance on 
community-level or supra-national organizations that hold no accountability to 
the states or to the people. The functionalists contend that the constitutional 
practices of representative democracies interfere with the processes of 
functionalism. The neofunctionalists assert that decision-making responsibilities 
should be held by the elites in a supranational organization. Both theories 
maintain that the job of running society should be left to experts, engineers and 
technocrats; and that if the social welfare needs of the people are met, they will 
follow. 
2. Federalism 
The theory of federalism also displays shortcomings which make it an 
unsatisfactory basis for ensuring the future cohesiveness of the EU.  The first 
-90- 
problem noted with federalism is that sovereignty tends to be gradually 
transferred from the states to the central government. The second problem is 
that the process of judicial review by the central court (in the U.S. case, the 
Supreme Court) historically has tended to rule in favor of the central 
government, thus stripping away authority from the states. 
a. Sovereignty 
When the sovereignty of the states is transferred increasingly to the 
central authority, the mode of redress of the state is greatly limited. For example, 
if the central government attempts to pass legislation which the state judges 
directly contrary to the well-being of its citizens, the state does not possess the 
proper authority to counter-act the central authorities. Another problem is that 
the state is represented in the House of Representatives by its proportion of the 
aggregate population of the federation, not as a state.272 Therefore, if the state 
has a smaller population, it will tend to have less influence in the decision- 
making process of the House of Representatives due to the rule of the majority. 
b. Judicial Review 
The creeping jurisdiction of the central courts has also been 
perceived by some analysts as a problem for the federal theory of integration. In 
the United States, as well as in the EU, precedents have been set that erode or 
even clearly take away the power of the state to gain redress on important 
matters. (These precedents are discussed in a later section of this chapter). Once 
the precedent is made, it is difficult to reverse. Often the states have no effective 
means to prevent further encroachment by the central government. 
272In the U.S. Senate, of course, every state-no matter how small-has two Senators. 
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3. Theory of Concurrent Majority 
The thesis has determined that John C. Calhoun's theory of concurrent 
majority provides a better model for assessing the future cohesiveness of the EU. 
Calhoun's theory is consistent with the early framework of the European 
Economic Community decision-making process (e.g.,  the  "Luxembourg 
Compromise")/ as well as the Maastricht Treaty negotiations.   The theory of 
concurrent majority contends that the states will retain their sovereignty upon 
entering into the compact. Also, the states will retain the capability to prevent an 
encroachment by the central government on their own spheres of sovereignty 
and authority.   The theory allows the compact to be amended to prevent 
stagnation and paralysis due to the objections of one or a few states. 
B. A EUROPEAN CONSTITUTION BASED ON THE THEORY OF 
CONCURRENT MAJORITY 
I—I ow can one fit the principles of concurrent majority theory to the European 
Union? Several aspects of the concurrent majority system are already in . 
place. For example, on important decisions, the Council of Ministers has to pass 
laws by unanimous consent. But several key components of concurrent majority 
theory are missing from the European system and thus prevent it from becoming 
a concurrent majority government.    This section examines the EU's key 
institutions (the Commission, the Council, the European Parliament and the 
European Court of Justice) and evaluates how they might fit into a constitution 
based on concurrent majority theory. 
The EU members who brought the Maastricht Treaty into being should 
have held special ratification conventions or national referendums for the 
purpose of doing so. Denmark, Ireland, and France had national referendums on 
the matter, but some of the other nations ratified the treaty via their national 
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legislatures. If the governments wish to ensure popular support on an issue as 
important as the European Union, and gain the advantages found in the U.S. 
precedent, the process of ratification should be slow and deliberate. The process 
should not have to be an all or nothing affair in which the non-unanimity of all 
fifteen nations would prevent union. Rather, as in the United States Constitution 
ratification process requiring the ratification of nine states to bring into effect the 
Constitution,273 three-quarters of the EU nations should be sufficient to bring 
together a more cohesive and integrated Union. And as other nations ratify the 
treaty within their own borders, they too would join the Union. This should be 
able to accomplish two criteria. The legitimacy of the Union to the people of the 
individual nations would be greatly increased. And the commitment of the 
individual nations to adhere to the laws of the Union would be strengthened. 
1. The European Parliament, the Council of Ministers and the 
Commission 
The European Parliament (EP) has long been regarded as the "democratic 
anchor" for an integrated Europe.274 From its inception, the EP has been 
struggling to make itself a more influential body within the EU. The first 
instance of the EP gaining any power within the Union occurred in 1975, when it 
obtained co-decisional power in formulating the EU budget with the Council of 
Ministers.275 The next step came in 1987 with the Single European Act (SEA), 
whereby the EP was granted the power to have two readings of legislation, 
273The Constitution of the United States of America, Article 7 
274See for example, Juliet Lodge, "The European Parliament and the Authority-Democracy 
Crises," The Annals of the American Academy of Political Scientists 531, (January 1994): 69-83; 
"European Parliament:   The Democratic Dream," The Economist (21 May 1994) 21-24; and 
Andrew Duff, "Building a Parliamentary Europe," Government and Opposition 29, no. 2 (Spring 
1994): 147-165. 
275The EP, prior to 1975, had the power to dismiss, en masse, the Commission, but this was seen 
as a "nuclear weapon," something which could only be used as an ultimate weapon.   See 
"European Parliament The Democratic Dream," The Economist: 22. 
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propose amendments, veto new members from coming into the Union, block 
certain agreements and establish committees of inquiry on the Commission and 
the Council.276 The EP was described as resembling an "upper house, entitled to 
scrutinize, question, delay, and sometimes amend."277 
The results of the Maastricht treaty, after much negotiation,278 for the EP 
were as follows: an increase in readings of proposed legislation, an increase in 
the areas subject to co-decision-making, broadened veto powers, the right to veto 
the Council's choice for Commission president, and an increase in the number of 
Members of the European Parliament (MEP's). The actual role of the European 
Parliament is changing from that of a backwater repository for politicians to that 
of an effective legislative body endowed with substantive and broadening 
powers. The representative nature of the Parliament is seen as a threat by the 
Council of Ministers because the EP is a truly supranational organization that is 
not accountable to the national governments, but to the voters. 
The EP may be expected in the future to exercise its new powers to its 
fullest, and to test the limits of its delegated powers. At the next 
Intergovernmental Conference in 1996, the EP will probably further try to extend 
its powers by: "requesting assent for all constitutional matters," a right to advise 
and consent on Commission appointments, and authority regarding individual 
censure of Commission members.279  The assent on constitutional matters, in 
276Andrew Duff, "Building a Parliamentary Europe:" 148-149. 
277
 "European Parliament: The Democratic Dream," The Economist 22. 
278The best single source on the negotiations of the Maastricht Treaty is Richard Corbett, The 
Intergovernmental Conference on Political Union," The Toumal of Common Market Studies 30, 
no. 3, (September 1992): 271-298. •   „      ,      „. 279Andrew Duff, "Building a Parliamentary Europe:" 164. The assent on constitutional matters 
would include modifying the scope of the EU budget (Article 201) Rasing the powers of the 
Treaty (Article 235), and adopting constitutional Amendments (Article 236). The article that Duff 
mentions in regards to amending procedures (Article 236, which was originally established in the 
Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community in 1957), have been repealed in the 
Maastricht Treaty on European Union (the Maastricht Treaty is a set of provisions amending the 
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order to be consistent with Calhoun's model of concurrent majority, should be 
prescribed only if a two-thirds absolute majority of the EP is obtained. On 
normal legislative matters, the assent of the EP might be based on either an 
absolute majority of all MEP's or a super-majority (three-fifths), not a majority of 
those present. This would require the MEP's to be more attentive to legislative 
matters and at the same time give the EP more credibility. 
The manner of representation for the EP also correlates with the theory of 
concurrent majority in that the smaller states have a greater proportion of 
representation in relation to their size than do the larger states. The current 
powers that the EP possesses seem to go up to the limits of Calhoun's theory, 
however. Even though many speak of the EU's "democratic deficit," to make the 
EP a pure parliamentary democracy on the model of the House of Commons or 
the Bundestag would put the majority of the votes of the EP in just four of the 
fifteen members (Germany, France, Britain and Italy). In order then to make a 
compromise with the proponents of the European Parliament, one could make 
the EP into a lower house and the Council of Ministers into an upper house, each 
having a check on the other. The Council could still use qualified majority voting 
(which requires roughly seventy percent of the votes in order to pass legislation), 
while the EP could use perhaps a super-majority system (three-fifths) or an 
absolute majority. 
The Council, as stated before, closely resembles the concurrent majority 
system with regard to the number of votes required to pass legislation. 
Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community with a view to Establishing the 
European Community). This means that any amendment to the Treaty is only through the EU 
branches and not through the electorate of the member states (via national referenda or special 
ratifying conventions). While this may make it easier to change the Treaty, it makes the treaty 
much more susceptible to being changed due to a passing passion of the moment, without the 
knowledge of the people. 
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Moreover, on important issues, unanimity is required.280 A possible change to 
the Council would be to have the individual member state Minister be a 
permanent position, and have the minister for the particular topic area (e.g., 
agriculture, finance, and fisheries) under discussion act as a deputy-advisor to 
the EU Minister of the nation-state. This would enable each member state to 
have a minister that would be cognizant of all EU matters, thus having greater 
situational awareness of how different matters might affect his or her member 
state. (Such an arrangement is apparently already the case in some member EU 
countries.) Another improvement would be to allow greater public scrutiny of 
the proceedings of the Council. If the citizens of the member states had a greater 
knowledge of the deliberations of the Council, they would be able to play a 
greater role in the affairs of their particular nation and the EU as a whole. In any 
future scenario of an integrated Europe, the Council will probably continue to 
maintain the status of primus inter pares in relation to the other EU branches. 
The European Commission acts as the executive branch of the EU. It 
proposes legislation and enforces the Treaty obligations of the member states. 
Since the advent of the Single European Act (SEA), the Commission has come 
under increasing scrutiny as a bureaucratic hegemon within the EU. The 
Maastricht Treaty limited the powers of the Commission in that the EP must 
approve the appointment of the Commissioners, who are proposed by the 
Council; also, the Commission is no longer the sole initiator of legislation.281 
A problem may stem from is the fact that the Commission is made up of 
representatives from the member states. The more the EU increases in 
membership, the greater the number of Commissioners it will have. This leads to 
280Richard Corbett, "The Intergovernmental Conference on Political Union/' 289-290. 
281
 "Cacophony in Brussels," The Economist. (3 September 1994): 49-50. 
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the proposition that "talented people with too little to do often make 
mischief."282 Since the EP cannot dismiss individual Commissioners, the 
Commission may at some point attempt to overstep its bounds without fear of 
reprisals from the EP or the Council. To remedy this, the EP might be 
empowered to remove individual members of the Commission who are acting 
contrary to the guidelines of the Treaty, provided that they obtain a two-thirds 
vote in the EP to this effect, and an affirmative from the Council as well. 
Some may argue that some of the aforementioned suggestions could 
produce gridlock and ineffective government, and that to rely on the Council 
could result in compromise and indecisive Community action. This is, for the 
most part, true. Yet one should always remember that politics is the art of 
compromise. To take decisive action on the will of a simple majority of the 
aggregate might, in the absence of proper safeguards, be unfair to the minority. 
So, for example, France, Italy, Spain, Greece, Portugal and Belgium (all economic 
interventionists283), with a simple majority in the EP, could dictate to the rest of 
the Union the social and economic path to take. This could mean central 
government control of the European Central Bank, something that the Germans 
are vehemently against.284 A system of governance that requires all the parties to 
compromise to reach consensus allows the system to function without hostility of 
one interest against the other. 
2. The European Court of Justice 
Special attention should be paid to the ECJ. Just as the United States 
Supreme Court has taken an increasingly powerful role in the federal 
282lbid. 
283James B. Steinberg, "An Ever Closer Union:" European Integration and its Implications for the 
Future of U.S. - European Relations (Santa Monica, CA: RAND R-4177-A, 1993): 18. 
284Ibid.: 83. 
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government,285 so too has the EC} taken an increasingly influential role in the 
EU.286 Some students of the EU surmise that the ECJ is the institution most 
responsible for progress in the integration process of the EU thus far.287 The role 
of the ECJ has come to encompass judicial review and, some would argue, 
judicial activism as well. While proponents of deeper integration in the EU view 
the current policies of the ECJ as an asset, others view the ECJ as a political body 
pursuing its own agenda without being accountable to the electorate.288 
Several landmark decisions of the ECJ have gone far in allowing the ECJ to 
not only further the integration process, but to consolidate its own power within 
the EU. The cases include Van Gend en Loos v. Nederlandse adminstraite der 
belastingen   (1963) and Costa v. ENEL   (1964).289   Both cases stipulated the 
285For example, the Supreme Court has recently ruled, in U.S. Term Limits, Inc., et cd. v. Thornton et 
al, (No. 93-1456), that the States did not have the right to set term limits on if s members of the 
U.S. House of Representatives or the Senate. 
286For excellent analyses of the ECJ in the process of political integration, see Martin Shapiro and 
Alec Stone, "The New Constitutional Politics of Europe," Comparative Political Studies 26, no. 4 
(January 1994): 397-420; G. Frederico Mancini, "The Making of a Constitution for Europe," in 
Robert O. Keohane and Stanley Hoffman, eds., The New European Community: Decisionmaking 
and Institutional Change (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1991): 177-194; Anne-Marie Burley and 
Walter Mattli, "Europe Before the Court: A Political Theory of Political Integration," 
International Organization 47, no. 1 (Winter 1993): 41-76; J.H.H. Weiler, "A Quiet Revolution: 
The European Court of Justice and Its Interlocutors," Comparative Political Studies 26, no. 4 
(January 1994): 510-534; and J.H.H. Weiler, "Journey to an Unknown Destination: A 
Retrospective and Prospective of the European Court of Justice in the Arena of Political 
Integration," Tournal of Common Market Studies 31, no. 4 (December 1993): 417-446. 
287Anne-Marie Burley and Walter Mattli, "Europe Before the Court: A Political Theory of 
Political Integration." International Organization 47, no. 1 (Winter 1993): 41-76. The authors refer 
to the ECJ as the "unsung hero" of political integration. The Court, rather than being the arbiter 
of the contents of the Treaty of Rome and other EU texts, becomes the "policy maker" to prevent 
any "erosion of the community." The authors also argue that the ECJ follows the neofunctionalist 
model of integration in that the Court circumvents the nation-state to promote integration while 
appearing to stay within the bounds of the legal framework of the EU. (p. 57). 
288Ibid.: 47-48. The authors are referring to Hjalte Rasmussen's On Law and Policy in the 
European Court of Tustice. Rasmussen's thesis is that the ECJ-while pursuing its judicial 
activism-"was guided by its own rigid policy preferences and repeatedly went 'way beyond the 
textual stipulations [of the treaty] leaving behind it a variety of well-merited, legal-interpretative 
principles'." 
^
89G. Frederico Mancini, "The Making of a Constitution for Europe," in Robert O. Keohane and 
Stanley Hoffman, eds., The New European Community: Decisionmaking and Institutional 
Change (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1991): 180, footnotes 8 and 14. 
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"undisputed existence of a supremacy clause in the Community framework" that 
was the result of the "judicial creativity" of the Court.290  The Court has also 
gained ascendancy over the member-states through Article 177 of the Treaty of 
Rome: 
The Court of Justice shall have jurisdiction to give preliminary rulings 
concerning: 
(a) the interpretation of this Treaty; 
(b) the validity and interpretation of acts of the institutions of the Community 
and of the ECB;291 
(c) the interpretation of the statutes of bodies established by an act of the 
Council, where those statutes so provide. 
Where such a question is raised before any court or tribunal of a Member State, 
that court or tribunal may, if it considers that a decision on the question is 
necessary to enable it to give judgment, request the Court of Justice to give a 
ruling thereon. 
Where any such question is raised in a case pending before a court or tribunal of 
a Member State, against whose decisions there is no judicial remedy under 
national law, that court or tribunal shall bring the matter before the Court of 
Justice.292 
This Article is seen now as a vehicle for citizens to challenge their national 
courts where the national law is in conflict with the EU law.293 Therefore, a 
citizen or a lower court can invoke Article 177, in which case the ECJ may give its 
interpretation of the preliminary ruling. The ruling handed back down from the 
ECJ to the national court is then binding, and the national court has to use that 
290lbid. 
291The words, "and of the ECB," were inserted into the article in the Maastricht Treaty on 
European Union in 1991. 
292Mancini, in "The Making of a Constitution for Europe," in Robert O. Keohane and Stanley 
Hoffman, eds., The New European Community:   Decisionmaking and Institutional Change 
(Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1991): 184, interprets Art. 177 of the Treaty of Rome as giving the 
Court jurisdiction "to rule, on a reference from courts and tribunals of the member states, on any 
question of interpretation and validity of Community law raised before them; lower courts may 
request the Court of Justice to give a preliminary ruling, whereas courts of last resort must send 
the matter to Luxembourg [the seat of the ECJ]." (Emphasis added.) 
293Ibid.: 185. 
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interpretation of the ruling in its own final decision. In essence, the decisions of 
the ECJ are superior to those of the national courts.294 Due to this 
constitutionalization of the EU treaties, the ECJ is now seen as the highest court 
in the land in every EU member state.295 
Anne-Marie Burley and Walter Mattli state quite categorically that the 
ECJ, and the legal profession associated with Community law, are dedicated to 
seeing the Court used for the purpose of further integration and the 
advancement of its own political agenda.296 "By denying the existence of judicial 
activism and thus removing a major potential locus of opposition to the Court, 
they (the EU legal community) promote an institution whose pro-community 
values accord with their own internalized values."297 
Why have the EU members been acquiescent in letting the ECJ make the 
judicial rulings without any apparent struggle? J.H.H. Weiler hypothesizes that 
four reasons explain why the national courts and governments have allowed the 
ECJ to do what it has done.298 The first is formalism. The national courts and 
governments have accepted the ECJ decisions because the apparent hierarchical 
nature of the ECJ and the language of "legalese" have lent that body a position 
assumed to be superior to that of the national courts and governments. The ECJ 
294J.H.H. Weiler, "A Quiet Revolution: The European Court of Justice and Its Interlocutors," 
Comparative Political Studies 26, no. 4 (January 1994): 515. 
295Mancini quotes French Prime Minister Michel Debre: "I accuse the Court of Justice of morbid 
megalomania." See Mancini, 'The Making of a Constitution for Europe:" 177. 
296Anne-Marie Burley and Walter Mattli, "Europe Before the Court:   A Political Theory of 
Political Integration," International Organization 47, no. 1 (Winter 1993): 69-71. The authors add 
that the criticism about the ECJ's judicial activism "reveals that the substantive stakes concern the 
prospects for the Court's self-professed task, integration.  In heeding wide-spread advice to 
maintain a careful balance between applying community law and articulating and defending 
community ideals, the Court is really preserving its ability to camouflage controversial political 
decisions in 'technical' legal garb." 
297lbid.: 70. 
298J.H.H. Weiler, "A Quiet Revolution: The European Court of Justice and Its Interlocutors:" 
520-528. 
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has had "senior jurists from all member states" and the language of the rulings 
has given the ECJ the appearance of an austere and prestigious body that must be 
obeyed.299 
A second reason put forth by Weiler is self-interest. For the national 
courts, it has been advantageous to fall in line with the portions of the legal 
profession which have "developed a stake-professional, financial, and social-in 
the successful administration of Community law by and through the national 
judiciary and [which] have thus acted as an agency for its successful 
reception."300 In other words, the national courts wanted to share in the laurels 
of praise for integration and to gain associated benefits. The self-interest for the 
national governments lay in the fact that the Court could make the bargains set 
forth in the Treaty stick with the other members.301 One could also hypothesize 
that the national governments would adhere to the Court decisions because the 
governments could then tell their respective constituents that they had no power 
over the decisions of the ECJ, thus absolving themselves of responsibility for any 
potentially unpopular decisions which might endanger them with the voters.302 
Weiler gives as a third possible reason for the acquiescence of national 
courts "reciprocity and transnational judicial cross-fertilization."303 This lengthy 
term implies that the national courts accept the rulings of the ECJ because the 
other national courts do likewise, and failure to accept the ECJ rulings might give 





302This hypothesis could apply to any government with a national court system. 
303Ibid.: 521. 
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Weiler's fourth explanation is judicial empowerment.304 Article 177 gave 
the lower courts in each member state considerable power against the national 
courts (because they could appeal beyond the national courts to the ECJ), and the 
national courts increased power over the national governments (because they 
could also seek additional authority through ECJ decisions). According to Weiler 
"the ingenious nature of Article 177 ensured that national courts did not feel that 
the empowerment of the ECJ was at their expense."305 
Weiler adds that the national governments have perceived the ECJ as a 
neutral body, staying within its legal bounds.306 Another explanation for the 
national governments' acceptance is transparency.307 The ECJ's decisions were 
accepted, in the pre-Single European Act European Community, because the 
governments held the veto of the "Luxembourg Compromise" to block any EU 
measure that they felt was inimical to their interests. 
As one compares the decisions of the ECJ with those of the United States 
Supreme Court (as discussed in Chapter III), one can draw parallels between the 
two with regard to the precedents which consolidate the power of the courts and 
the central governments. Without a clear set of guidelines within the treaty text, 
and without any explicit reference to gaining judicial redress by the national 
courts or governments, the ECJ has gone beyond its original scope. Even 
Chancellor Kohl, a firm supporter of European integration, has stated that: "If 
one takes the Court of Justice...it does not only exert its competencies in legal 







wanted in the beginning. This should be discussed so that the necessary 
measures may be taken later."308 
One can sense a growing reluctance to place full faith in the ECJ to protect 
national sovereignty. For example, one could hypothesize that in the future, with 
a powerful ECJ, and an inability by the member states to protect themselves, the 
ECJ could rule that the actions or policies of certain national governments are 
contrary to the spirit of the EU. Since EU law is held superior to national law, 
that particular national government might find that specific actions or policies 
are no longer considered legal within the framework of the EU. And since the 
member states have had a history of acquiescing to decisions by the ECJ, with a 
string of precedents to uphold the ECJ, it would be difficult indeed for the 
member state to dissent. This example illustrates how matters that are 
traditionally left to the member states to decide upon may be in the hands of a 
court that is beyond the reach of the electorate. 
The Maastricht Treaty reflects of a growing distrust of the ECJ in that it 
excludes the ECJ from two of the three pillars.309 The 1996 Intergovernmental 
Conference will also introduce the idea of "restricting lower-level national courts 
from sending preliminary ruling questions to the Court" in accordance with 
Article 177.310 Weiler suggests creating regional Circuit Courts (analogous to the 
U.S. Federal District Courts), and a transformation of the ECJ into a more 
308Kohl cited in ibid.: 533. The citation was taken from Europe, 14.10.92, No. 5835. 
309Burley and Mattli, "Europe Before the Court:" 73-74. The two pillars mentioned are the 
foreign and security policy, and justice and home affairs. The pillar that the ECJ does have 
jurisdiction is the Maastricht Treaty on European Union. One could argue, though, that the Court 
may decide that since EU law is the supreme law of the land it has precedence over 
intergovernmental laws or treaties. In other words, it might be argued that, since the ECJ is the 
ultimate arbiter of EU law, it therefore has proper jurisdiction over any intergovernmental treaty 
that concerns members of the EU. 
310Karen J. Alter and Sophie Meunier-Aitsahalia, "Judicial Politics in the European Community: 
European Integration and the Pathbreaking Cassis de Dijon Decision," Comparative Political 
Studies. 26, no. 4 (January 1994): 558. 
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narrowly defined Constitutional Court.311 It will be important to establish a 
clearly defined set of constitutional parameters for the ECJ to operate in, and to 
allow the member states, as well as the other EU institutions, to have some mode 
of redress or protection from any encroachment by the ECJ. 
A supreme court is an integral part of any constitutional government. It is 
the bulwark of the constitution and the protector of the citizens' rights from any 
encroachment by the government. But, as with any organization, there may be 
times when it will be run by people wishing to aggrandize its power at the 
expense of other institutions. The court may also at times choose to operate as a 
"third chamber," providing policies for the rest of the government to follow 
without any choice, for Western governments have had many centuries of 
tradition in following the rule of law. What Calhoun argued throughout his 
career was that power should not be concentrated; it should not come to rest at a 
single point. Rather, the checks on power should be well-distributed: the states 
having a check on the central government, the central government having a 
check on the states, the electorate having a check on both, and the constitution 
having a check on the electorate. 
3. The Member States 
As stated before, in any sort of compact or union, the separation of powers 
should not only be within the central government, but between the central 
government and the member states. The member states need to retain some 
mode of self-defense against encroachment by the central government.312 If the 
EU Treaty does not explicitly contain provisions for the member states, and the 
people of the states, to retain control over their sovereignty, the creeping 
311J.H.H. Weiler, "Journey to an Unknown Destination/' 442. 
312One could argue that the United Nations Charter sanctions this in Article 51, acknowledging 
the "inherent right of self-defense." 
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jurisdiction of the central government that has been observed in past political 
unions may ultimately prevail. For example, Article 236 of the Rome Treaty was 
repealed in the Maastricht Treaty. Article 236 stated: 
The Government of any Member State or the Commission may submit to 
the Council proposals for the Amendment of this Treaty. 
If the Council, after consulting the European Parliament and, where 
appropriate, the Commission, delivers an opinion in favour of calling a 
conference of representatives of the Governments of the Member States, the 
conference shall be convened by the President of the Council for the purpose of 
determining by common accord the amendments to be made to this Treaty. 
The amendments shall enter into force after being ratified by all the 
Member States in accordance with their respective constitutional 
requirements.313 
With Article 236 repealed, there is no clearly defined procedure for the amending 
process. The central government could therefore conceivably amend the Treaty 
without the concurrence of the member states. 
If the European Union wished to establish a comprehensive concurrent 
majority system, the principle of nullification and amendment would be 
explicitly written into the constitution. This would enable the member states to 
retain their sovereignty, yet not allow any single member to bring to a halt all 
action in the central government. In the current Maastricht Treaty, Article 3b 
states: 
In areas which do not fall within its exclusive competence, the Community shall 
take action, in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity, only if and in so far 
as the objectives of the proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the 
Member states and can therefore, by reason of the scale or effects of the proposed 
action, be better achieved by the Community.314 
313The Maastricht Treaty on European Union simply states that Article 236 "shall be repealed." 
314Karlheinz Neunreither, "Subsidiarity as a Guiding Principle for European Community 
Activities," Government and Opposition 28, no. 2 (Spring 1993): 206-220.  See also George A 
Bermann, 'Taking Subsidiarity Seriously:" 331-456. 
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The exclusive competencies are not specifically delineated in the Treaty. 
The reason, some believe, is to allow the EU Commission and European 
Parliament (and the ECJ) to retain flexibility in determining which areas of 
competence belong to the EU and themember states respectively.315 If, then, the 
EU has to determine which areas fall under its competency, Calhoun's theory 
suggests, the EU will always tend to favor decisions that will grant it more 
powers. Calhoun's theory also indicates that the constitution should have a clear 
set of delegated powers that the EU can operate with. Inside the proper 
boundaries, the EU has, by the lawful consent of the member states, proper 
jurisdiction within which to operate to its fullest capacity. 
But, should any attempt by the EU to go outside its delegated powers 
occur, Calhoun's theory implies, the EU should not be allowed to be the ultimate 
arbitrator. For example, if a nation thought a law passed by the EU injurious to 
the well being of its citizens,316 and the law was in conflict with the constitution 
of the EU, the offended nation would bring its grievance to the European Court 
of Justice. If the ECJ failed to give it satisfaction, Calhoun's theory indicates, the 
nation could then hold a national referendum or a national convention to 
determine if the offensive law is indeed unconstitutional and injurious to the 
nation. If the nation so determined, the national government would then nullify 
the offending law. 
Yet, if the other nations within the European Union determined that the 
law (that was offensive to the nullifying nation) was, in fact, constitutional and 
valid, then, with a qualified majority in the Council of Ministers, and a super 
315Ibid.: 209. 
316For example, one could hypothesize that the EU might pass a law via qualified majority voting 
in the Council that all members must buy goods manufactured in the EU prior to goods 
manufactured outside the EU. Such a law might well encounter objections from industries and 
other economic interests in specific EU countries. 
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majority (two-thirds of all MEP's) in the European Parliament, an amendment 
could be proposed to make the law a part of the constitution, with the 
concomitant amendment process started to determine if the law should, in fact, 
be part of the constitution. If the constitution was so amended, with the 
concurrence of three-fourths of the European Union member states, the 
nullifying nation would then have a responsibility to obey the constitution. For, 
as Calhoun stresses throughout his writings, the law of the constitution should 
always have ascendancy over the legislative law. It should be recalled that the 
member state has ratified the constitution, thus promising to obey all parts of the 
constitution. If the offensive law has become part of the constitution that the 
state has promised to honor, then it follows that the state has the duty to honor 
its commitment. 
C. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
11 remains to be seen if the EU, in the 1996 review conference, will be able to 
successfully create a constitution, or as Calhoun refers to it, a "compact." 
There is a growing sense of ambivalence towards the EU in some of the member 
states.317 Britain is committed to the intergovemmentalist approach.318 France's 
increasingly Gaullist tendencies make it more nationalistic than prior to the 
debate over ratification of the Maastricht Treaty.319 Even in Germany, one of the 
317James B. Steinberg, "An Ever Closer Union": 139-141. 
318
"Memorandum on the United Kingdom Government's Approach to the Treatment of 
European Defence Issues at the 1996 Inter-Governmental Conference." The memorandum states 
in paragraphs 20 and 21 that the "nation state should be the basic building block in constructing 
the kind of international order we wish to see/' and that the "differing rights and responsibilities 
of nations should be respected." It would seem that even with a change of government, the 
opposition to "an ever closer union" would be just as strong. 
^"France's Wandering Eye," The Economist (26 November 1994): 55-56. The article states: 
"And virtually nobody liked the crack about countries such as France that still cling to the notion 
'that it is impossible to give up the sovereignty of the nation state, although this sovereignty has 
long since become an empty shell.' French sensitivity arises because the question of sovereignty 
goes to the heart of the dilemma over Europe." The "crack" referred to may be found in the fall 
1994 CDU document on the future of the EU. See also Jean-Baptiste Duroselle, "General De 
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most staunch supporters of the EU, "attachment to the European institutions 
[has] diminished."320 People in some of the smaller EU countries-Denmark, for 
instance-have also expressed apprehension regarding a centralized EU.321 
Political experience suggests that the EU institutions-above all, the ECJ, 
the European Parliament and the Commission-will always try to centralize their 
power, and that the member states will always try to retain as much power as 
they can. If the status quo is kept, the EU will remain relatively ineffectual in the 
most difficult areas of operation (e.g., certain aspects of security and foreign 
policy) and may thus continue to lose legitimacy in the eyes of the citizens of the 
member states. If the EU took the route of strict federalism (or, for that matter, 
the functionalist or neofunctionalist route), the prospects for centralization would 
be enhanced, thus eroding the sovereignty of the member states. But, if the path 
of concurrent majority was followed in some form, the EU would have a 
government that could operate cohesively and effectively in its delegated 
powers. The member states would then be able to pursue their interests with 
their reserved powers, assured that their identities as sovereign nations were not 
in jeopardy. 
Gaulle's Europe and Jean Monnef s Europe," in Carol Ann Cosgrove and Kenneth J. Twitchett, 
eds., The New International Actors: The UN and the EEC (London: Macmillan, 1970): 187-200, 
for a detailed view of de Gaulle's thoughts on an integrated Europe. 
320Jacob Heilbrunn, "Tomorrow's Germany," The National Interest (Summer 1994):   44-52. 
Heilbrunn adds:  "the Bundesbank has made it abundantly clear that it will not sacrifice the 
deutschmark on the altar of European unity," and that the "Christian Democrats (CDU) [have] 
begun to show some distinct unease about European unity..." (p. 45). 
32
^The centralizing tendencies of the political union were apparently one of the reasons why the 
majority of voters in Norway did not want to join the EU. For example, most Norwegians did not 
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